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The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
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The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is currently pursuing the most 
comprehensive transformation of its forces since the early years of World War II.  This 
transformation is a holistic approach to update both the equipment that the forces will 
fight its conflicts with and the way that they will fight the conflicts.  Incorporating 
emerging technology with revolutionary tactics, the primary goal of the US Army 
transformation is the development of the Future or Objective Force.   
The Future Force is characterized by a lighter, more agile force that is able to 
deploy faster, seize the initiative and finish decisively.  Since legacy systems are 
inadequate to facilitate all of the goals of DoD transformation, the Department of the 
Army is developing the core building block of the Future Force known as the Future 
Combat System (FCS) Family of Systems (FoS).  The FCS takes advantage of advances 
in battlefield sensing, fire control and lethality to allow the battlefield commander to 
engage the enemy at standoff, diminishing their will to fight while mitigating friendly 
losses.   
Engaging an enemy at standoff using unmanned sensors assumes a line of 
communications that will enable the transfer of the information that the “hunters” observe 
to the “killers” for action.  While many experts agree that over the course of the next 10 
years communications equipment will emerge to support the networking of these 
systems, there remains much uncertainty on how operations will be affected if the 
technology does not mature enough to meet expectations or enemy electronic attack 
assets are employed to disrupt friendly operations.  This research focuses on the FCS 
employed in the attack against a prepared and well fortified defensive enemy when 
communication degradation is experienced in one or many battlefield operating systems.   
To uncover insights on the effects of degraded communications, a scenario was 
created in Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA), an agent-based simulation 
designed for examining many possible factors over many settings using a technique 
known as data farming.  Using the state-of-the-art experimental designs outlined in this 
  xx
thesis, over 50,000 individual simulations provided the data to uncover insights on what 
happens if communications do not work “as advertised.” 
This scenario replicates a battle vignette previously analyzed by Training and 
Doctrine Command Analysis Center, White Sands Missile Range, on a physics-based 
simulation called JANUS.  This physics-based simulation, however, did not take the 
effects of degraded communications into account.  The area of operations was digitized 
into MANA and individual fighting systems were created to closely represent the FCS 
designs.  A screen shot of the final battlefield configuration is shown below. 
 
The results of this thesis work suggest the following: 
• While it is believed that communication range will not be an issue with evolving 
communications equipment, the Army must be sure of this.  Even a degradation 
  xxi
of 25 percent on the ability to communicate over the entire battlespace could have 
dramatic consequences for the FCS.   
• An unresponsive or slow network is nearly as detrimental to the FCS as 
diminished communications range.  It has been shown in this analysis that when 
intelligence on a fairly static enemy employed in the defense is delayed, the 
length of battle is extended and Blue forces generally pay for that delay in 
casualties.  
The significance of these communications factors are shown in the regression tree 
below.  This tree shows that when communications allow the FCS to relay intelligence 
over at least 75 percent of the battlespace, network latency is less than one minute, and 
throughput of the network is “sufficient,” the expected number of Blue casualties is 
around nine.  In comparison, when communication range is degraded more than 25 
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Additional findings include: 
• Reliability, while important, is not as significant in a system with many means of 
redundancy (such as the FCS).  Even if a substantial amount of communication 
links are unable to relay enemy intelligence, there are many others that are able to 
“pick up the slack.”  
  xxii
• Enemy electronic warfare assets must not be underestimated and should be a 
focus of any pre-engagement intelligence activities.  As indicated in this research, 
even a limited attack focused on a particular battlefield operating system (armor 
assets), could prove to be costly for the FCS.  
• The increased lethality of the non-line of sight systems, when performing as 
specified, present an incredible asset which can set the tone for FCS battlefield 
success and must be allowed to attrite the enemy as long as possible. 
• It is worth noting that even with the technologically advanced future force, 
traditional determinants of battle outcome (leadership, enemy posture, friendly 
and enemy morale) will still be just as important to victory.  As General George 
Patton once said, “It is the unconquerable nature of man and not the nature of the 
weapon he uses that ensures victory." 
The largest take-away from this analysis is that a viable communication network 
IS important to the FCS.  This network requires special attention when designing its 
characteristics and should be treated as a MAIN component of the FCS.  If a 
communication network is unable to support the integration of all of the battlefield 





I. INTRODUCTION  
The need for military transformation was clear before the conflict in 
Afghanistan and before September 11th…. What’s different today is our 
sense of urgency—the need to build this future force while fighting a 
present war.  It’s like overhauling an engine while you’re going 80 miles 
an hour.  Yet we have no other choice. 
President George W. Bush 
At the Citadel, Charleston, SC December 11, 2001  
A. TRANSFORMATION BACKGROUND 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is currently pursuing the most 
comprehensive transformation of its forces since the early years of World War II.  This 
transformation is a holistic approach to update both the equipment that the forces will 
fight its conflicts with and the way that they will fight the conflicts.  Incorporating 
emerging technology with revolutionary tactics, the primary goal of the US Army 
transformation is the development of the Future or Objective Force.   
A look at recent US conflicts reveals a strategy of “fight after force buildup.”  
When viewed from the context of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Enduring 
Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom this philosophy was very successful.  These conflicts 
allowed for a time period where forces were massed in theater, followed by buildup of 
logistic effort, and ending in advance against the enemy.    Future conflict, however, may 
not allow for this massive buildup before employment.  In addition, the face of the future 
enemy is changing from regional state powers to a more asymmetric threat that may 
require an entirely different strategy and equipment mix.   
Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, when characterizing the future of armed 
conflict following Desert Storm, said: “I am quite confident that in the foreseeable future 
armed conflict will not take the form of huge land armies facing each other across 
extended battle lines on the field of battle.  Conflict in the future will be similar to that 
which we have seen in the recent past.  Both of the military operations in which we were 
involved with in the Middle East were the result of regional conflicts that grew to 
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proportions that began to impact the rest of the world.  Such dangerous regional conflicts 
will be with us for years to come.  Any one of them could lead us to war.”1     
The future operational environment poses complex, adaptive and asymmetric 
threats equipped with advanced technologies.  Thus, the key to Army Transformation is 
on developing equipment that will be flexible and mobile enough to employ land forces 
that are decisive at every point on the spectrum of military operations.  The mid 1990’s 
standard of deploying 5+ divisions within 75 days, according to many within the 
Department of the Army (DA), is a luxury that the force will not have in future conflict.     
With all of this said, leadership in the DoD and DA are pushing forward with the 
Army’s Future Force.  The Future Force is characterized by a lighter, more agile force 
that is able to deploy faster, seize the initiative and finish decisively.  Since legacy 
systems are inadequate to facilitate all of the goals of DoD transformation, the DA is 
developing the core building block of the Future Force known as the Future Combat 
System (FCS) Family of Systems (FoS).  Optimized for strategic versatility, this 
equipment is designed to be C-130 and C-17 transportable for quick response to any 
theater.2  Army transformation requirements for this force include the ability to put a 
combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a full division in 120 
hours, and five divisions on the ground within 30 days.3   The idea driving the design of 
the FCS is that with a change in the way the Army fights, it can trade “a pound of armor 
for a pound of information.”4   
There are two critical enabling capabilities required to make the vision of the 
Future Force tenable.  The first is the requirement of high situational understanding and 
the second is decisive tactical combat.  Situational understanding allows the commander 
to enter the conflict on his terms and seize the initiative through knowledge of both his 
                                                 
1 H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: the autobiography: it doesn’t take a 
hero / written with Peter Petre, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 502. 
2 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Army Future Force: Decisive 21st Century 
Landpower Strategically Responsive, Full Spectrum Dominant, (Fort Monroe, VA, August 2003), 
Retrieved 5 May 2004 from the World Wide Web at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdcs , pp. 1-5. 
3 Global Security.org, Future Combat Systems, Retrieved 31 March 2004 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs.htm . 
4 Colonel Jeff Appleget, Future Combat System (FCS) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Briefing, (Given 
to NPS Operation Analysis students), 14 August 2003. 
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and the enemy’s forces.  Decisive tactical combat refers to the advanced capabilities with 
respect to mobility and long-range precision fires, which enables the commander to 
engage and attrite the enemy at standoff.5    
With the previous conceptual information on the FCS, the reader may be curious 
as to the physical description of the FCS.  The FCS consists of mobile platforms (most 
are armored) that are organized according to primary functions.  Such functions include 
Line-of-Sight (LOS) / Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS) / Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) 
weapon systems, Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms, soldier platforms, and support 
platforms.  Each platform is designed to operate in concert with the others to provide the 
tactical commander with a common relevant operational picture (CROP) of the 
battlefield.  To simplify, the FCS employs platforms in different roles.  One role is as the 
hunter—these describe systems designed to detect, classify and provide targeting 
information to other platforms.  The second role is as the killer—these describe systems 
that are designed to use organic and inorganic situational awareness to deliver killing 
power on the enemy. 
In addition to developing new equipment for the force to fight its conflicts with, 
transformation also includes a second main component: developing new tactics that the 
force will fight with.  In order to meet this component, the Army has developed an 
Operational and Organizational plan to reorganize the current fighting force and develop 
tactics that are consistent with employing the technology.  The driving idea of this plan is 
that to enable flexible and mobile land forces, the main fighting unit must be a modular 
and tailorable force.   
Under the Future Force nomenclature, the Unit of Action (UA) is the term used 
for the Brigade (~1200 soldiers).  Units of Acton (UA) are the tactical warfighting 
echelons of the Objective Force and command 3-4 combined arms (CA) battalions.  The 
Unit of Employment level 1 (UE1) is the term used for today’s Divisions (~15,000 
soldiers).  Each UE1 is designed to command 4-5 UAs but also maintain and support the 
warfighting elements. Units of Employment are the basis of combined arms air-ground 
                                                 
5 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Army Future Force: Decisive 21st Century 
Landpower Strategically Responsive, Full Spectrum Dominant.  p. 4-5. 
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task forces that resource and execute combat operations; designate objectives; coordinate 
with multi-service, interagency, multinational and non-governmental activities; and 
employ long range fires, aviation and sustainment.  They also provide C4ISR and tactical 
direction to UAs.   
The tactics, while varied for any given mission, make use of the developing 
technologies that allow the unit to effectively engage and attrite the enemy at greater 
ranges without commiting significant numbers of ground forces until operationally 
advantageous.  A sample attack operation might include a period of reconnaissance by 
unmanned air and ground systems, followed by engagement by NLOS fires, BLOS and 
finally LOS fires and ground force commitment.   The NLOS and BLOS fires are 
directed by the unmanned air and ground systems, and LOS fires are employed once the 
momentum and battlespace shaping favors the attacking element. 
Engaging an enemy at standoff using unmanned sensors assumes a line of 
communications that will enable the transfer of the information that the “hunters” observe 
to the “killers” for action.  While many experts agree that over the course of the next 10 
years communications equipment will emerge to support the networking of these 
systems, there remains much uncertainty on how operations will be affected if the 
technology does not mature enough to meet expectations or enemy electronic attack 
assets are developed to disrupt friendly operations. 
 




B. COMMUNICATIONS: THE FCS ENABLER 
As discussed thus far, the Army’s FCS relies heavily on timely and accurate text, 
voice and video communications to provide the CROP to the tactical commander.  As 
defined by the Operational Requirements Document for the FCS, “the network must be 
dependable and capable of functioning degraded, [greater than 80 percent (threshold) and 
98 percent (objective) static, and greater than 75 percent (threshold) and 90 percent 
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(objective) mobile].”6  In addition to inherent technical issues with radio and satellite 
based communications, as an old military proverb describes, “the enemy gets a vote too.”   
While the FCS network must be able to operate reliably with all of its moving pieces and 
parts which make it function, it must also be able to do this in the presence of an enemy 
trying just as hard to ensure that the network fails.  This is known as electronic warfare 
(EW).   
Nearly every military officer will concede that at some point in their career, poor 
tactical communications hampered their ability to fight.  United States Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, commenting about lessons that apply to future combat said, 
“…the ability of forces to communicate and operate seamlessly on the battlefield will be 
critical to our success.”7 The US Army Chief of Signal, MG John Cavanaugh 
summarizes the importance of tactical communication to warfighting by saying: “The 
next war will be won or lost based on the [Signal] Regiment’s ability to get information 
to the warfighter; the victor will be the one with ‘information dominance.’”8 
In a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the FCS program drew 
much criticism about the maturity of the technology designed to make up for the lack of 
armor with precision and speed.  The report emphasized the design of every soldier, 
every drone and every armored vehicle joining together in a wireless network for combat 
and the difficulties with making this happen.  The report asserts that this could prove to 
be the toughest FCS task of all, likening it to the difficulty of setting up a cell-phone 
system—under fire, without any towers.  In addition, the information-centric nature of 
FCS operations requires a great deal of bandwidth to allow large amounts of information 
to be transmitted across the wireless network.  However, the radio frequency spectrum is 
a finite resource with a great deal of competition and demand for it (commercial and 
                                                 
6 Operational Requirements Document for the Future Combat Systems (Change 3), (Unit of Action 
Maneuver Battle Laboratory, 14 April 2003), p. 41. 
7 Transcript of remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Defense 
University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Thursday, January 31, 2002, Retrieved  4 March 2004 from the 
World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html . 
8 Marketing Brochure from the Office of the Chief of Signal, Retrieved 17 February 2004 from the 
World Wide Web at http://www.gordon.army.mil/ocos/rdiv/docs/Marketing percent20Brochure.pdf . 
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military).  An internal study revealed that even if this system could be setup, FCS 
bandwidth demand was 10 times greater than what was actually available. 9  
 Numerous examples exist of communication affecting the ability of a unit to fight.  
During Operation Desert Storm, one forward deployed US Marine reconnaissance unit 
observed the initiation of the only major Iraqi offensive mounted during the war.   While 
observing this initiation, they found themselves unable to communicate the impending 
threat to the main fighting element.  This situation is described by David Morris, a former 
Marine Officer involved in the battle, as follows: 
8:00 PM, January 29, 1991 
Observation Post 4, on the Kuwaiti Border  
50 Miles West of Khafji, Kuwait 
Things weren't looking good for Roche. He was the comm chief and had 
two other radio operators under him. He was supposed to be the platoon's 
radio guru, and yet he couldn't raise a soul. What had he missed? He 
sprinted away from the berm to go check on the long-range antenna farm 
he'd set up in order to reach back to the rear, some 50 miles distant. Intel 
had told them the Iraqis didn't have any jamming capability. What else 
could it be? Then, thinking back, he remembered that right as their watch 
began, the pitch of the radio static, the ubiquitous background ssssshhhhh, 
had wavered ever so slightly. It seemed kinda weird at the time. Then he 
knew: They were being jammed. 10 
While the results of the battle and war were in favor of the US forces, many Marines lost 
their lives in the course.  This leads to the question: “What if the communications would 
have been able to overcome the enemy EW?”  
A more recent and equally tragic example occurred with another Marine unit 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The battle for the bridges in Nasiriyah began early on 
March 23, 2003, the fourth day of the war.  The mission for Charlie Company, part of the 
1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment out of Camp Lejeune, N.C., was to secure a bridge 
across the Saddam Canal on the northern edge of the city. Controlling the span was 
essential to opening a route for a massive Marine Expeditionary Force to attack Baghdad.  
                                                 
9 Paul L. Francis, Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, Risks, and 
Alternatives, (United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C., April 1, 2004), Retrieved 22 
April 2004 from the World Wide Web at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04635t.pdf . 
10 David J. Morris, Storm on the Horizon: Khafji – The Battle that Changed the Course of the Gulf 
War, (New York Free Press, 2004), p. 1-2.  
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When the Marine units around the city lost communication, commanders became 
confused about the location of American troops.  Subsequently, two A-10 tank killing jets 
were given permission by an air controller to attack what turned out to be a forward 
Marine company.  The 15 minutes of air attacks on the friendly forces using 30-
millimeter Gatling guns, Maverick missiles and bombs, ended in the destruction of two 
amphibious assault vehicles that were trying to evacuate wounded Marines and multiple 
Marine deaths due to fratricide.11 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Recognizing that the communications network is a high risk component of the 
FCS, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations (DCS G-3) tasked the US 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with (among other items) conducting 
an operational analysis of the communications and computer systems network for the 
FCS FoS.12  The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the effects of network loading, 
network attacks, and individual system reliability on the contribution of FCS to the UA’s 
effectiveness.   
In order to evaluate these effects of the network, TRADOC first must develop a 
way to model the communications network.  Significant effort has been exhausted in 
order to develop a model that will accurately model the physical effects of radio waves 
such as propagation, and network effects.  Propagation effects are those that cause the 
strength of a signal to be degraded.  Factors that might influence propagation include the 
transmission media (dense foliage, buildings of varied construction, etc.), climatic 
considerations (maritime, polar tundra, tropical arid and wet, etc.), and elevation of the 
communication nodes.  Factors that might influence the network effects are queue buffer 
sizes, latency caused by the network, and routing protocols.   
Once these models are completed, they must be incorporated into existing combat 
models to evaluate the effects of the communication environment on the UA’s 
effectiveness.   While there is little disagreement as to the value of accurately modeling 
                                                 
11 Hector Becerra, Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connnell, Report Details ‘Friendly Fire’ Casualties in 
Deadly Battle, (Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2004) .  
12 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, Memorandum for Commander US Army Training and 
Docterine Command (Director Futures Center) – Post Milestone B Analysis for Future Combat Systems 
(FCS), 29 October 2003. 
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the physical effects of communication in order to determine the effects of degraded 
communication, this work is difficult, complex and still has yet to be incorporated into a 
combat simulation to provide insights.   
This thesis will examine TRADOC’s tasked analysis question concerning the 
effectiveness of the FCS under various network communication conditions with a lower 
resolution model.  The overwhelming goal will be to identify the regions where 
communication reliability, network loading and attacks hamper the UA’s ability to fight.  
The results of this analysis are not designed to take the place of the high resolution, 
physics-based modeling that is ongoing, but is focused on a lower resolution data point 
that can be delivered quickly on a limited personnel budget (one soldier and his thesis 
advisors) and a limited time budget.   
D. SCOPE 
There are an endless number of questions regarding how communication 
conditions might be affected in various operating environments.  Many combinations of 
terrain (desert, rolling vegetation, mountains), force structures (Company, Battalion, 
Brigade), enemy disposition (equipment on hand, familiarity with terrain, end strength), 
and mission sets (attack, defense, movement to contact), exist.  This thesis will focus on 
one such operating environment.   
This analysis is focused on a UA Combined Arms Battalion in the attack using the 
Caspian Sea area of operations.  The scenario and force structure for the analysis is taken 
from a Training and Doctrine Analysis Center—White Sands Missile Range (TRAC-
WSMR) vignette used for the FCS Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) conducted in the 
Spring of 2003.13  (Note: this Analysis of Alternatives vignette made the assumption that 
there was no Electronic Warfare (EW) played by the enemy.  It was my intent to replicate 
this vignette as closely as possible in an agent-based  model while assuming that EW can 
and will occur.)  This thesis does not examine the directed task of analyzing individual 
communication system reliability due to model and time limitations.     
In order to keep this thesis within the limits of what can reasonably be explored in 
the allotted time, the following research questions scope the direction of the research: 
                                                 
13 Captain Matthew Mock (TRAC-WSMR), Central Asia Vignettes (Vignette C4.1) FCS BN(-) attack 
vs. prepared Infantry defense Briefing, Sent via email 3 December 2003. 
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• What characteristics of communications are imperative and at what levels are 
they significant for a combined arms battalion of the Army’s Future Force 
employed in the attack? 
• How do network latency, range, reliability, and throughput affect the Future 
Force’s ability to fight and win decisively? 
• How do network attacks (complete and partial degradation) and the Future 
Force’s ability to respond to the attacks hamper fighting ability?  
• If destroyed or hampered, which communication link(s) most affect the 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 11 
II.  CASPIAN SEA ATTACK SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
This chapter begins with a brief outline of the AoA process, followed by a 
discussion on the key weapon systems of both the Future Force and Red forces in the 
scenario.   This is followed up with a thorough overview of the vignette used as the basis 
for the analysis.  The intent is to leave the reader with an understanding of why the 
scenario was chosen as well as the advantages of using the scenario to evaluate the 
effects of communication on a battle outcome.   
A. FCS ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES PROCESS 
TRAC—WSMR was the Army’s lead agency for conducting the AoA of the FCS.  
This analysis took place over the course of eight months from May 2002 to January 2003 
and compared the cost and operational effectiveness of the FCS UA to the alternatives.  
The purpose of this analysis was to provide senior decision makers with quantifiable 
comparisons between the current legacy forces, the intermediate forces being fielded and 
the new FCS scheduled to be fielded in the 2010 to 2014 timeframe.  This AoA is 
required by DoD instruction and is intended to assist decision makers in selecting the 
most cost-effective materiel alternative to satisfy a mission need.14 
The FCS AoA was a very broad-based and thorough analysis that covered several 
versions of the FCS employed in a variety of environments and mission sets.  The two 
primary simulations used in the evaluation were CASTFOREM and JANUS.15  Both of 
these models are stochastic, physics-based models that are widely accepted throughout 
the entire Department of Defense as a valid method for evaluating ground maneuver 
combat.  Since the FCS, with its networked systems, fights very differently than current 
legacy forces, many of the traditional measures of effectiveness (e.g. force exchange 
ratios and loss exchange ratios) did not accurately measure “effectiveness.”  Thus, new 
measures of effectiveness were developed, such as: size of the area of operations 
controlled by a given element, time to complete the mission, kills at standoff 
                                                 
14 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,  DoD Instruction 5000.2, 12 
May 2003, Retrieved  5 February 2004 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/i50002p.pdf. 
15 DMSO website, Retrieved 25 May, 2004 from the World Wide Web at 
https://www.dmso.mil/public/ . 
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(NLOS/BLOS vs. LOS), and acquiring and killing high payoff targets.  Two of these 
measures are used for this subsequent analysis.   
The results of the analysis showed that when the network performed as indicated, 
the FCS’s enhanced situational awareness, agility, responsive and lethal fires put the new 
force at a significant advantage over legacy and interim forces.  The capabilities of the 
FCS resulted in the ability to control a significantly larger AO with fewer committed 
forces in a shorter amount of time.  One of the key factors they found was that enemy 
acquisitions occurred earlier in the FCS and enabled the commander to plan maneuver 
and effects before contact.  As well, the FCS gained targetable (detect and classify) 
information about high payoff targets (HPT) earlier, allowing the commander to negate 
key enemy assets.  Analysts, however were very aware that the network and C4ISR assets 
are now a very lucrative target for the enemy and further analysis was warranted, which 
led to the follow-on physics-based communications analysis that is ongoing.   
B. FCS SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION 
The FCS in its entirety consists of 24 major component platforms organized by 
function.  These functions include LOS / BLOS weapon systems, NLOS weapon 
systems, C4ISR, Soldier and Support systems.  All mounted systems have common 
attributes such as C-130 and C-17 aircraft transportability, add-on armor capable, and a 
common core chassis for reduced logistics burden.  In addition, active protection systems, 
designed to intercept large caliber kinetic energy rounds come in various configurations 
for each of the FCS platforms to increase survivability despite the loss of heavy armor.  
This analysis employs and directly models 12 of these systems.  To understand each of 
the platforms, a brief synopsis of purpose and capabilities for each modeled system is 
provided below.  Each of these descriptions are extracted from the Army FCS UA 
Systems Book16 used for all modeling to date.    
1. Mounted Combat System (MCS) 
The FCS manned combat platform that provides offensive maneuver to close with 
and destroy enemy forces is known as the MCS.  It can most easily be compared to a 
legacy M1A series main battle tank.  The MCS delivers precision fires at a rapid rate to 
                                                 
16 US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (US AMSAA), Army Future Combat Systems Unit of 
Action Systems Book Version 3.0, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD, 22 May 2003. 
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destroy multiple targets quickly.  It fights differently than its legacy counterpart in that it 
maneuvers out of contact to positions of advantages and uses its superior precision fires 
to destroy enemy armor at standoff.  Its increased mobility enables direct support to 
dismounted infantry in an assault, defeating bunkers and breaching walls during a tactical 
assault.  Its main gun is a 120mm, direct fire, kinetic energy weapon with a basic load of 
43 rounds.  The MCS also comes equipped with a mix of the MK-19 40-mm automatic 
grenade launcher or the M2, 0.50 caliber machine gun as its close support weapon.   It 
has the capability to target enemy Main Battle Tanks, light armor, artillery, and air 
defenses from 2-12 kilometers using both organic and inorganic sensing abilities. 
2. Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)   
The FCS manned combat platform that provides the mobility for 11 personnel 
(two-man crew and nine-man infantry squad) on the battlefield is known as the ICV.  The 
nearest legacy comparison to the ICV is the M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle.  This asset is 
commanded by the infantry platoons and companies within the combined arms battalion 
and delivers dismounted forces to the close battle.  In addition, the ICV supports the 
squad by providing self-defense weapons support and carries the majority of the squad’s 
equipment, freeing the individual soldier form being burdened with equipment.  The ICV 
can also be reconfigured to carry two anti-tank guided missiles or to carry litter patients 
as a medical vehicle.  The main close support weapon is the MK-44, 30mm chain gun 
that provides mobility or firepower kills to enemy light armor vehicles from 1500 to 2000 
meters.  Sensor capability for the ICV varies dependent on configuration, but is designed 
primarily to identify and classify LOS targets.   
3. Armed Robotic Vehicle Assault Variant (ARV-A) 
The FCS unmanned system configured for support of dismounted infantry in the 
assault is known as the ARV-A.  Externally transportable in an operational configuration 
by utility helicopters, the ARV-A remotely provides reconnaissance capability in military 
operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT) and other battlespaces.  Its primary use is in 
support to the dismounted infantry with its direct fire and AT weapons.  It possesses the 
ability to remotely deploy unmanned sensors, remotely locate or by-pass threat obstacles 
in buildings, bunkers and tunnels.  A secondary mission is to remotely assess BDA and 
provide a communications retrans node as required.   When employed, the ARV-A has 
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the capability to be operated semi-autonomously (manual initial program of routes, 
autonomous thereafter) in rolling open terrain or manually operated by video feed.  The  
ARV-A comes equipped with three Javelin ATGMs designed to engage MBTs at zero to 
five km.  In addition, it possesses close support / suppressive fire ability provided by the 
M-240B 7.62mm machine gun.   
4. Armed Robotic Vehicle — Reconnaissance Surveillance, and Target 
 Acquisition Variant (ARV-RSTA) 
The FCS system that is designed to provide remote reconnaissance capability in 
MOUT and other battlespaces is known as the ARV-RSTA.  As with all unmanned 
systems, the overwhelming goal of the system is to provide information about the area of 
operations without placing manned systems in harms way.  The nature of this unmanned 
system allows the commander the flexibility to employ it in an atypical manner to 
confuse and deceive the enemy while “flushing” them out.  The primary purpose of this 
vehicle is to remotely deploy sensors, identify threat obstacles and identify bypass areas 
in buildings, tunnels, bunkers, and other urban features to provide enhanced situational 
awareness to the maneuver unit.  Secondary purposes of this platform are to provide a 
communications relay as well as provide remote BDA.  This platform employs the M-
230, 30mm chain gun as its defensive weapon system.   
5. Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS Mortar) 
The NLOS Mortar is a manned mobile platform that provides short range indirect 
fires in support of assault battle units.  The weapon is mounted on the common core FCS 
chassis and provides responsive indirect fires (8 to 10 rounds per minute) with its 120mm 
smooth bore mortar tube.  The key to this system lies in its ability to provide fire support 
out to 12 to 15 kilometers, significantly improving on modern mortar fire support.  The 
system is employed in a Combined Arms Battalion, allowing the commander organic fire 
support, facilitating responsiveness.  The NLOS Mortar also comes with either a 0.50 
caliber machine gun or a MK-19 grenade launcher as its close support weapon.   
6. Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS LS) 
The NLOS LS is the FCS platform which provides networked, extended-range 
targeting and precision attack of armored, lightly armored, and other stationary and 
moving targets.  The system’s primary purpose is to provide responsive precision attack 
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of HPTs in support of the UA.  This platform can most easily be compared with M-270 
MLRS — Multiple Launch Rocket Systems which are in the army inventory today.  The 
significant differences between the MLRS and NLOS LS are in the munitions available 
and the fire control system.  NLOS LS has a variety of improved munitions available 
such as loitering missiles which fly over a designated target area until a target presents 
itself (up to 30 minute loiter time).  The fire control system is enhanced to allow in-flight 
targeting updates of moving targets.  Precision munitions are designed to operate out to 
40-60 kilometers, allowing attrition of key enemy mounted systems without committing 
dismounted or LOS units.   
7. Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS Cannon) 
The NLOS Cannon is the FCS manned combat platform that provides networked, 
extended range targeting and precision attack of point and area targets in support of the 
UA.  This system is most easily compared with the M-109/A6 Paladin self propelled 
howitzer which is in the army inventory today.  The significant difference between the 
current system and the NLOS Cannon lies in the fire control system.  The improved fire 
control system enhances responsiveness by providing fires within 15 seconds and firing 
6-10 rounds per minute at a range of 30-40 kilometers.  The NLOS Cannon is employed 
at the UA level in support of a Combined Arms Battalion.  The platform also possesses 
self defense capability through its 0.50 caliber machine gun or MK-19 grenade launcher.      
8. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (R&SV) 
The heart of the “hunter” systems in the FCS is the R&SV.  This platform 
provides streamlined acquisition, discrimination of multiple target sets using its onboard 
sensor systems.  The sensors are designed to detect, locate, track, classify and 
automatically identify targets from increased standoff ranges under all climatic conditions 
during both day and night operations.  Key to the advanced sensors is the ability of the 
R&SV to communicate its information to “killer” systems such as the various NLOS 
systems through its robust communication abilities.  The platform comes equipped with 





9. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle — Class I, II, and III (UAV - CL I, II, III) 
The FCS hosts a variety of UAVs designed to provide capability for RSTA 
operations in open, rolling, complex, and urban terrain, under canopy, and in MOUT 
environments.  The Class I and II UAVs are vertical take off and landing platforms that 
are organic to the platoon and company levels respectively.  Both platforms have various 
sensor configurations available (e.g. thermal, enhanced optical imagery and radar) to 
provide the pertinent information desired by the unit depending on the operational 
environment.  The Class III UAV is a fixed wing aircraft capable of providing similar 
capabilities to the Class I and II UAVs, however, with increased endurance and 
additional features such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear detection and 
enhanced sensors.  The Class III UAV is employed at the battalion level.  All three UAVs 
possess significant communication ability to provide retrans and real-time targeting 
information to other FCS “killer” systems.  The primary purpose of all UAVs available to 
the FCS is to reduce operational and tactical risks associated with small unit operations 
by providing early warning and targeting information without committing manned assets.   
10. Land Warrior Future Combat System (LW-FCS) 
The LW integrates small arms with high-tech equipment, enabling ground forces 
to deploy, fight and win on the future battlefield.  Land Warrior looks at the soldier as a 
complete weapon system in comparison with the “legacy” mindset that the soldier was a 
component of a given weapon system. Land Warrior consists of three main thrusts: 
lethality, survivability, and command and control.  Key to the integration of these thrusts 
is incorporating these functions with the uniform that the soldier wears.  Land Warrior 
has five subsystems: the weapon, integrated helmet assembly, protective clothing and 
individual equipment, computer/radio, and software.   
C. RED FORCE SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION 
The Red force pitted against the FCS used in this analysis resembles a company 
sized element of the modern day Russian Motorized Rifle Battalion.  All enemy systems 
descriptions are extracted from the Jane’s Information Group website17, an unclassified, 
yet well respected source commonly used in analysis of this type.  Examples abound 
                                                 
17 David C. Isby, Organization of the Russian Motor Rifle Battalion, in Jane’s Intelligence Review 
[online journal] (volume 007/001, 1995 [cited 29 April 2004]); Retrieved 5 January 2004 from the World 
Wide Web at http://www4.janes.com . 
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where Jane’s is used for development of force structure such as the paper entitled 
“Objective Force Urban Operations Agent-Based  Simulation Experiment” by Lloyd 
Brown and Thomas Cioppa.18   
The MRB company consists of approximately 104 personnel (primarily 
dismounted aided by mounted systems).  While, in all, the MRB has 22 major weapon 
systems in its inventory, this analysis focuses on the modeling of only eight systems.   
While significant effort was exerted to ensure the same level of detail in the modeling of 
the Red force weapon systems, the characteristics of each system will only be briefly 
outlined in Table 1.   
System Description Major System Characteristics 
BMP-3 2A-42 / 30mm Machine Gun (200 rounds per minute, 4000 
meter range) 
82mm Mortar Smooth bore mortar (8-10 rounds per minute, 4000 meter 
range) 
SA-16 – MANPAD Man Portable Air Defense  System (2 minute acquisition / 
firing time with range up to 5000 meters) 
RPG-7 Rocket Propelled Grenade - short range (100meters) with 
reloadable warheads 
AT-7 Anti-tank guided missile (1500 meter firing range) 
RPK-74 5.45 mm light machine gun (50 rounds per minute at 460 
meter maximum effective range) 
AK-M 7.62 mm sub machine gun (15 rounds per minute at 400 meter 
maximum effective range) 
SVD 7.62mm Sniper Rifle (1000 meter maximum effective range) 
Table 1. Description of Major Red Force Weapon Systems 
                                                 
18 Brown, Major Lloyd and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cioppa, Objective Force Urban Operations 
Agent-based Simulation Experiment, US Army TRADOC Analysis Center Technical Document TRAC-M-




D. MODEL VIGNETTE DESCRIPTION 
This analysis focuses on a UA Combined Arms Battalion employed in the attack 
against a company sized enemy.  The scenario we use is derived from analysis conducted 
by TRAC-WSMR during the Analysis of Alternative of the FCS during summer 2002.19    
The scenario was originally conducted in JANUS with the main purpose of analyzing 
weapon system effectiveness between the three options examined in the AoA.  
Understanding the main goal of the original analysis is key, since TRAC-WSMR’s focus 
was not on how various communications environments might affect a battle.   
The vignette takes place in what the FCS considers “complex terrain.”  In general 
terms, this type of terrain is described by limited avenues of approach with fast changing 
relief, such as mountainous terrain.  The actual location is in the Caspian Sea area, 
specifically the country of Azerbaijan.  While the specific location holds only limited 
pertinence to current military operations, the terrain set holds several beneficial aspects 
when evaluating the FCS.  Such benefits are that the diverse terrain taxes the mobility 
and agility of the FCS.  With a limited road network, limited infrastructure, and steep, 
mountainous terrain, the FCS is placed in a difficult scenario which it must overcome.  
The advanced guided munitions from the NLOS systems are suited for overcoming some 
of the mobility shortfalls, but rely upon the advanced sensors to feed the operational 
picture.  In addition, the terrain set exercises the relatively new concept of BLOS, that is, 
using networked overhead sensors to extend the line of sight of weapon systems that were 
typically known to be strictly LOS. 
                                                 
19 US Army TRACOC Analysis Center, Objective Force / Future Combat Systems Analysis of 
Alternatives Tactical-Level Force Effectiveness Analysis, US Army TRADOC Analysis Center Technical 
Document TRAC-WSMR-SB-03-027-3, TRAC White Sands Missile Range, September 2003. 
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Figure 1.   Caspian Sea Area of Operations 
 
During the original analysis, this vignette assumed that the links between the FCS 
systems were 100 percent reachable and reliable with no enemy intervention.  The term 
reachable and reliable is used in this context to describe the ability of the unit to 
communicate throughout the battlespace without having to worry about enemy 
interdiction or malfunction of any equipment.  As has been alluded to previously, this 
concept could prove to be the largest challenge of the FCS and is the assumption that this 
analysis investigates. 
The disposition of the enemy forces in this analysis is outlined in Figure 2.  The 
Red forces are assumed to be at 100 percent strength and have the advantage of being in 
well fortified and prepared defensive positions.  Extending this knowledge of fortified 
positions, an additional assumption was made that the Red forces are immune to any 
communications difficulties.  This is not a far fetched assumption since with more time, 
many forms of redundant communications could be established, such as radio and 
satellite communications at the top of the technology spectrum or wire communications 






















Figure 2.   Red Force Task Organization / Capabilities 
 
The Red forces have intelligence to indicate that the FCS desires seizure of a key 
airfield in the area of operations, but is unaware of the time or precise location of 
advance.    Given this situation, the Red force mission is to defend in order to deny FCS 
use of the airfield.  To this end, it arrays forces in a decentralized area defense, occupying 
covered and concealed positions that overwatch the airfield and air corridors to the 
airfield.   
The disposition of the Blue forces is outlined in Figure 4.  The FCS Combined 
Arms Battalion has been outfitted with all of the organic assets the force is templated to 
have at fielding in 2012.  The force structure has been tailored to the mission and 
assumes priority of a portion of two key UA supporting assets to include three NLOS LS 
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Figure 3.   Blue Force Task Organization / Capabilities 
 
The CA Battalion attack against the Red forces is a component of a larger UA 
mission that is to attack with three CA battalions within the area of operations to defeat 
enemy forces.  The purpose of this attack is to secure use of the airfield to facilitate 
freedom of maneuver of follow-on forces.  The concept of the UA mission is to attack 
objective FORD with 1st CA BN (the focus of this analysis) to secure the terrain 
influencing the airfield to provide secure air corridors for follow-on forces.  The other 
two CA BNs will then attack to the south of the airfield to secure the southern corridor to 
the airfield.  This general concept, with enemy templated defenses is depicted graphically 











Figure 4.   Graphical Depiction of UA Attack Mission  
 
To detail the focus of this analysis a bit more, the 1st CA BN’s attack concept in 
their area of operations is conducted in three phases.  Phase 1 is known as the 
Reconnaissance and NLOS fight.  This phase deploys reconnaissance assets (RS&V, 
UAVs) forward of the main fighting element (consisting of the MCS, IFVs and NLOS 
systems) and attrites the Red forces with NLOS systems.  The goal of reconnaissance 
elements is to identify Red force obstacles and defensive positions and feed this 
information to indirect firing systems.  Phase 2 is known as the LOS / BLOS fight.  This 
phase deploys MCS assets forward to establish support by fire positions outside of enemy 
AT systems range to provide BLOS fires destroying enemy infantry fighting vehicles in 
zone.  ICV platoons then attack along AXIS LEG to destroy defending forces.  Infantry 
platoons dismount in the vicinity of CP D and maneuver ICVs to positions to support 
with MK-44 weapons.  Phase 3 is known as the consolidation and reorganization phase 
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and secures the terrain overlooking the airfield.  In addition, 1st CA BN establishes a 
hasty defense in preparation for any Red force counterattack.  This detailed concept is 

















Figure 5.   Graphical Depiction of 1st CA BN’s Attack Mission 
 
In accordance with most deliberate military planning, the indirect fires have been 
prioritized by firing system and associated priority targeting.  This attack guidance matrix 
is shown in Table 2.  This guidance will provide a basis for modeling assumptions used 
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Table 2. NLOS / BLOS Attack Guidance Matrix 
 
Now, with an understanding of the scenario being used, a thorough discussion of 
the model follows.  In addition, a detailed description of the methods used to replicate 
behaviors and characteristics of the various weapon systems is included.     






III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Anything but war is simulation 
General Paul Gorman USA Retired 
 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of simulation models in general and 
follows up with a description of Agent-Based Models (ABMs) and their place in combat 
modeling.  As the workhorse of this analysis, the chapter also discusses MANA, the 
ABM chosen for this problem.  The bulk of this chapter is dedicated to how agents and 
behaviors are modeled in MANA.  The chapter concludes with a description of 
shortcomings and “bugs” encountered during the course of the analysis.  The intent is to 
leave the reader with some degree of confidence that the model is reasonable for the 
scenario chosen and that parameters have a basis with physical characteristics of the 
system modeled.  
A. ABM OVERVIEW 
The U.S. DoD uses simulation models to support its decision making process.  As 
defined by the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office in its vision statement,20 defense 
modeling and simulation provides readily available, operationally valid tools for use by 
DoD components for two main purposes: 
• To train jointly, develop doctrine and tactics, formulate operational plans, 
and assess war fighting situations.  
• To support technology assessment, system upgrade, prototype and full scale 
development, and force structuring.  
Even if significant resources were available and it was permissible to pit forces against 
each other using real weapons to validate doctrine and tactics, many uncertainties would 
still exist.  It could be said that for every situation tested, there would be infinitely many 
variants of environmental conditions, enemy courses of action, and other intangibles that 
the fog of war bring out.   
                                                 
20 DMSO vision statement, Retrieved 5 May 2004 from the World Wide Web at  
https://www.dmso.mil/public/vision . 
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With this said, the DoD relies on modeling and simulation to capture insights and 
enable prudent decision making.  Simulation experiments can allow decision makers to 
test or train in conditions that would normally not be feasible due to safety, resource, or 
security restrictions.  At the core of these experiments are many physics-based models 
which attempt to replicate the physical effects of a certain action.  A round discharged 
from a weapon can be described with a high level of fidelity using well established laws 
of physics taking into account the velocity of the round, wind, atmospheric media, etc.  
Often these laws, however, require many input variables to accurately predict the location 
of impact or the force at which it impacts.  These high-resolution simulations are often 
complex and resource intensive.  A simulation which may have thousands of rounds fired 
from thousands of battlefield entities requires significant computing ability to provide the 
insights required for prudent decision making.     
Another approach to modeling these experiments is to attempt to replicate the 
behaviors of a certain battlefield action.  Using the discharged round example provided 
above, one could observe that a round when fired from a weapon at a given distance has 
an estimated probability of hitting its intended target.  Further, it can be observed that 
certain rounds will be effective against certain targets and vice versa.  ABMs seek to 
employ a “small” set of rules with which simulation entities known as agents react to 
stimulus.   
ABMs have developed to a degree such that they are appropriate for exploring 
small scenarios which are termed distillations.  Distillations are relatively small and 
simple scenarios that attempt to capture only the essence of a situation without trying to 
model all of the details that could be considered.21  Surely these models do not replicate 
all of the physical aspects of a certain situation, but they can provide significant insights 
to emergent behaviors as a result of variations in the rule set.   
ABMs are characterized by quick scenario set up and fast run times.  This allows 
the analyst to rapidly consider many alternatives.  This exploratory analysis approach 
attempts to help people think through complicated issues by illuminating the 
consequences of various assumptions, reinforcing or challenging intuition and illustrating 
                                                 
21 Brown, p. 3. 
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alternatives that might have been overlooked.  This leads to the process of identifying 
regions, ranges, and thresholds where interesting things happen rather than predicting, 
optimizing, or tuning.22   To be clear, ABMs are not designed to take the place of 
detailed, physics-based models, but are designed to augment these models by permitting 
users to examine the problem at hand over a much broader range of possibilities.  These 
fast running models can be used as screening tools during problem formulation to scan 
the problem space, allowing identification of areas of concern for deeper analysis by 
physics-based models.23   
Models are for thinking 
Sir Maurice Kendall 
 
B. ENTER MANA 
Much of the information presented in this section is taken primarily from the 
MANA User’s Manual.24  Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) was developed 
by New Zeland’s Defense Technology Agency (DTA).  In the spirit of the previous 
discussion about ABMs, MANA stands for: 
• Map Aware — Agents are aware of and respond to, not only their local 
surroundings and terrain, but also a collective registry of recorded battlefield activities. 
• Non-Uniform — Not all agents move and behave in the same way (much like 
soldiers, sailors or airmen.) 
• Automata — Agents can react independently to events, using their own 
“personalities.”  Personalities, in general, are propensities that guide an agent’s actions to 
move. 
MANA was designed for use as a scenario-exploring model to address a broad 
range of problems.  The model is not intended to be able to describe every aspect of a 
                                                 
22 Lucas, Tom, Susan Sanchez, Major Lloyd Brown, William Vinyard, Better Designs for High 
Dimensional Explorations of Distillations, Maneuver Warfare Science 2002, edited by Gary Horne and 
Sarah Johnson, 2002. 
23 Brown, p. 6. 
24 Galligan, David P., Mark A. Anderson, Michael K. Lauren, Map Aware, Non-Uniform Automata 
version 3.0, New Zeland Defense Technology, February 2004. 
 28 
military operation.  Furthermore, there is no built in “intelligence” which determines the 
plan that entities are working with.  As a result, agents do not always behave in a sensible 
manner and are capable of making what could be viewed as “mistakes.”   The developers 
give this caution and response:  
[C]areful thought must be given when setting up a scenario.  There must 
be a clear idea of which aspect of warfare the scenario is addressing, and 
what the entities are trying to do.  Though such an approach may seem 
pre-potted, the non-linear nature of the model ensures that, regardless of 
the modeller’s preconception, a startlingly large number of outcomes are 
possible.  Such a range of outcomes is characteristic of complex adaptive 
systems, and occurs even with quite simple rules of behavior.  This is the 
essence of what we are trying to do: explore the greatest range of possible 
outcomes with the least set-up time.  Since it is only necessary to have 
simple behavioral rules to achieve this, it seems almost pointless to make 
the rules more complicated than necessary.25    
The ability to take a rough problem, develop a scenario, and implement this 
scenario in short order with nothing more than a user’s manual and a standard 
performance personal computer made the choice of MANA as the platform for analysis 
simple.  MANA is designed around a well developed Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
which facilitates quick scenario setup and is well documented with many built in tutorial 
simulations.   Within just a couple of hours, a user can have a general understanding of 
how the model works and be on their way to tackling the problem at hand.   
C. BEHAVIOR MODELING 
1. Creating the Battlefield 
This section focuses on how agents were created in MANA.  Careful attention is 
devoted to showing screen shots to facilitate understanding of the model.  While the 
intent is to leave the reader with an understanding of the workings of the model, 
unresolved questions concerning model operation should be directed to the MANA Users 
Manual.   
The first step taken in this analysis was to get a handle on the physical 
characteristics of what is trying to be modeled.  Chapter 2 discussed some of the physical 
characteristics of the forces and platforms employed in the attack / defend scenario.  One 
may observe that each platform has certain attributes such as the ability to sense, 
                                                 
25 Galligan, p. 7. 
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communicate, move and shoot.  Of course, each platform has varying degrees to which it 
can do this, but these physical characteristics are the bedrock of behavior modeling.  To 
facilitate this process of converting physical characteristics to model parameters, a 
spreadsheet was created.  An excerpt from this spreadsheet is shown in Table 3.   
NLOS-Mortar
Lethality
Pri - weapons 120mm B/LOS
Unguided Fire Rate (L) - RPM 8
Fire Rage (H) - RPM 10
Range (L) - meters
Range (H) - meters 1000
Basic Load - rounds 65
Guided Fire Rate (L) - RPM 8
Fire Rage (H) - RPM 10
Range (L) - meters 12000
Range (H) - meters 15000
Basic Load- rounds 65
Lethal Radius - meters 60
Type CSW
M2 / MK 44* 1















x-cntry - kph 50
dash 0-48/ 8s
Sensing Type Radar Plus  
Table 3. Real-World Weapon Characteristic Spreadsheet Excerpt 
 
This spreadsheet serves as a single location to place major platform characteristics 
for conversion to model parameters.  An entry for each major platform and close support 
weapon on both Blue and Red forces was completed.  The example provided in Table 3 
shows the weapon characteristics for the NLOS Mortar.  The entire set of parameters for 
all weapon systems used in the analysis is given in Appendix A.  It is noted that the 
entries match the brief platform description provided in Chapter II of this thesis and the 
descriptions provided in the Army Future Combat Systems Unit of Action Systems Book.   
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The next step in the process of conversion to model parameters was to create a 
battlefield in MANA.  The battlefield in MANA is a rectangular grid that represents the 
battle space where agents interact.  The battlefield determines the resolution at which 
model entities react.  It has a map of the terrain and elevation of the area of interest based 
on a standard bitmap file.  Figure 6 shows the MANA panel where the battlefield is 
defined.  Two key things to note in Figure 6 are the Number of Cells and Real World 
Range blocks.   
 
 
Figure 6.   MANA Battlefield Definition Panel 
The Number of Cells block allows the user to specify the model grid size (this 
ranges from a size of 50 to 1000.)  Setting the number of cells to 1000 by 1000 ensures  
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the maximum resolution of the model in terms of movement and other calculations.  The 
Number of Cells is also key to converting real-world rates and distances to model 
parameters.   
The Real World Range blocks facilitate placement of forces on the battlefield 
once map files are loaded into MANA.  While these blocks are not necessary to ensure 
the proper functioning of the model, it allows the specification of the ranges in x and y 
directions represented by the model grid.  For example, if using a standard military map 
(as is the case with this analysis), grid locations on the map are represented by an 8 digit 
grid coordinate.  The first four digits represent the x location and the last 4 represent the y 
location.  These Real World Range blocks allow the user to bring the world of “MANA 
pixels” to a physical location on the ground.   
Once the MANA battlefield is defined, scenario maps can be loaded.  There are 
three different maps that can be loaded into MANA: background, terrain, and elevation.  
The background map is not used by any algorithms in the model, but is used as a 
cosmetic enhancement for the scenario.  A digital copy of the exact map in use for the 
tactical operation can be superimposed on the battlefield using the background map.   
The terrain map captures the essential details of the battlespace for use in various 
algorithms in the model.   MANA uses distinct colors to identify various terrain features.  
For example, the RGB color of 225,225,0 represents a road in MANA.  A road has three 
attributes associated with it: going, cover and concealment.  These attributes affect 
movement speed, kill probability and sensor detection of the agents in the model, 
respectively.     
The final map that can be used in the model is the elevation map.  As the title 
would indicate, this map contains information of the relief properties of the battlespace.  
Elevation maps are grey scale maps, ranging from white (highest point) to black (ground 
level).  There are 256 possible levels of grey (0-255) to represent the heights used in line 
of sight calculations.  By convention, MANA uses 10 times the grey scale color value to 
represent the real elevation.  The elevation maps add realism to the model by preventing 
observation by agents obscured by a hill or major terrain.   
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Once the resolution of the battlefield is selected, physical weapon / platform 
characteristics can be converted into model parameters.  In the scenario used in this 
analysis, it is noted that the real world battlespace occupies a 14.8 kilometer by 14.8 
kilometer area.  To ensure maximum resolution for movement computations, the MANA 
battlefield was set to a 1000 by 1000 pixel square.  Using simple algebraic manipulation, 
one can find a conversion factor to take real world ranges and convert these into model 
parameters.  The conversion factor for this scenario is shown below: 
1000 pixels meters = 14.8
14,800 meters pixel
 
For the NLOS mortar, the range of the weapon (as a MANA parameter), using 
this factor becomes: 
12,000 metersNLOS Mortar Range (in pixels) =  = 810.8 pixelsmeters14.8
pixel
 
Rates, such as speed of movement, are computed similarly, however, the user 
must specify a resolution of time.  In other words, the user must determine how many real 
world time units correspond to model time steps.  For this scenario, the time resolution 
was set at 1 minute to 15 time steps (or equivalently, 1 time step is 4 seconds).  The 
movement speed of the NLOS Mortar is computed as follows: 
pixels km 1 hour 1 min 1 pixel 1000 m pixelsNLOS Speed in  = 90  = 6.76
time step hr 60 min 15 steps 14.8 m 1 km time step
                        
 
These computations for the NLOS Mortar are summarized in Table 4 and are listed for all 
systems in Appendix A. 
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Conversion Computation X1 X2
for Model Parameters 4925 6405
1000 Square
 Real Time Mana Steps
Time Conversion 1 min 15
NLOS-Mortar
Lethality
Pri - weapons 120mm B/LOS
0.1 Unguided Fire Rate (L) - RPS 0.053
Fire Rage (H) - RPS 0.067
Range (L) - pixels
Range (H) - pixels 67.6
Basic Load - rounds 65.0
Guided Fire Rate (L) - RPS 0.053
Fire Rage (H) - RPS 0.067
Range (L) - pixels 810.8
Range (H) - pixels 1013.5
Basic Load- rounds 65.0
Lethal Radius - pixels 4.1
Type CSW
M2 / MK 44* 1















x-cntry - pix/ts 3.75
dash 0-48/ 8s
Sensing Type Radar Plus
Conversion Factor (Hr / Time Step)
0.00111







Table 4. NLOS Mortar MANA Adjusted Parameters 
 
2. Creating the Agents 
The previous section identified the method of computing MANA agent 
parameters.  Using a spreadsheet, it becomes a near trivial task to extend this to all 
platforms modeled once the real world data has been accessed.  This section focuses on 
creating the model agents.  In the MANA GUI, the way to create these agents is through 
the Edit Squad Properties option located under the Setup menu.  Once this option is 
opened, the user sees the screen shown in Figure 7.  Of particular interest is the presence 
of nine tabs, each of which will be discussed in brief, but is left to the reader to consult 
the users manual if further questions arise concerning model operation.   
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Figure 7.   Edit Squad Properties Option (General Properties) 
 
Each tab shows a screen divided up into two main portions common to all tabs: 
the settings section and a section for trigger state properties.  Trigger state dependent 
settings allow the agents to change their decision process when user specified events 
occur.  These include being shot at, taking a shot, reaching a waypoint, etc. The trigger 
state settings last for a user specified amount of time.  These changes can be for 
individuals or for a whole squad at once.    
The general tab allows the user to specify general properties for the agents in the 
squad, such as the number agents in the given squad as well the common name of the 
squad.  The general tab does not allow for trigger state dependent settings as indicated by 
the panel on the right hand side.    
The map tab gives initial direction to agents by establishing start points and 
waypoints to navigate towards.  This allows the user to simulate general movement 
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orders given to a subordinate unit for a given operation.  The path specified may be 
adjusted by the agent during the simulation depending on its personality settings.   By 
default, the final waypoint specified to a squad is its ultimate goal.    
The personality tab is where the modeler can set personality weightings that drive 
agents toward or away from goals, friendly forces, or enemy forces.  As indicated in 
Figure 8, these personality settings are trigger state dependent, allowing for more realistic 
modeling under various circumstances.  Each personality setting ranges from -100 to 100, 
indicating the propensity of the agent to move toward (positive settings) or away from 
(negative settings) a particular battlefield object.  The weighting factors can cause the 
entities to react to other entities, waypoints, terrain and information.  As discussed in 
previous sections, the personality of an agent is one of the key features that ABDs, and 
MANA in particular, presents over physics-based models.  The settings capture the “fog 
of war” and allow agents to make their own decisions, as opposed to the modeler 
explicitly determining their behavior in advance.   
 
Figure 8.   Edit Squad Properties Option (Personality Properties) 
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Since the focus of this analysis is not on the tactics of a certain operation, but on 
the communications aspects of combat, personalities in this scenario are only roughly 
modeled.  Agents in this analysis have basic personality traits for when moving toward 
the objective, when agents come under fire, when they reach waypoints, and their final 
destination.   These basic personalities are based on general observations from previous 
ABM FCS studies, such as that done by Lloyd Brown.26   
The Ranges tab allows the modeler to specify key squad attributes such as 
movement speed (as described previously—in pixels per time step), allegiance of icons 
(friendly, enemy, or neutral), and sensing ability.  To draw a comparison to modeling the 
behavior of a radar sensor, MANA does not try to replicate the propagation of a given 
radio wave throughout an atmospheric media as a physics-based model would.  Instead, 
MANA allows the user to specify ranges and probabilities of detection and classification.  
While this is an abstraction to the way the sensor may physically operate, the author 
believes that this behavior may be modeled sufficiently to capture the broad effects of the 
sensor.   
The weapons tab, as one might expect, describes weapon characteristics of the 
agents.  Each agent has the ability to possess up to four weapons.  These weapons are 
classified as direct or indirect fire (rifles or artillery pieces) and the manner in which they 
target their foe (using what they see, or using what their friends see).  Contacts are 
represented by shapes which indicate the class of the contact.  This notion of situational 
awareness is one of the key features of MANA and will be described later in this chapter.  
A sample situational awareness map is shown in Figure 9.   
                                                 
26 Brown, Major Lloyd, “Military Operations in Urban Terrain Excursions and Analysis with Agent-
based Models,” Maneuver Warfare Science, USMC Project Albert Quantico, VA, 2003. 
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Figure 9.   Sample Inorganic Situational Awareness Map (for NLOS Mortar) 
 
Each weapon has “physical” characteristics such as the range and the rate that it 
may engage an enemy (as described previously—in pixels and rounds per time step, 
respectively).  In order to accurately model the fact that the main gun on a tank would 
not, in reality, fire on a single infantry dismount, each weapon allows for the modeler to 
specify non-target classes.   
Situational awareness comes in three distinct types in MANA, agent, squad, and 
inorganic.  Agent situational awareness is nothing more than what an individual agent 
senses with organic sensors defined under the range tab.  Squad situational awareness 
allows a given group of agents to share a “memory” of the locations of agents that have 
been detected in the form of a collective picture of sensor information.  A low tech 
example of this awareness might be a soldier’s map board with templated enemy and 
friendly sightings.  Squads who share information between one another allow for 
inorganic situational awareness.  This inorganic situational awareness can be compared to 
networked communications between agents—the focus of this thesis.  As expected, many 
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of the parameters explored in this analysis are inorganic situational awareness 
parameters.     The inorganic situational awareness tab is shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.   Edit Squad Properties Option (Inorganic SA Properties) 
 
As indicated in Figure 10, there are 11 different communication properties that 
exist for every communication link.  Some of the parameters are self explanatory, such as 
range and reliability.  Each of these parameters may be set to specific values or, as is the 
case in this analysis, dynamically varied over realistic settings (best case, worst case and 
cases in between).  Parameters that may not be entirely clear as to what they model are 
discussed below: 
• Capacity — refers to the throughput of the communication link—this may be 
thought of as bandwidth or how quick messages may be sent.   
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• Buffer — refers to the number of messages that may be queued prior to 
sending.  This replicates possible hardware constraints that may be present in 
a given network. 
• Latency — this refers to how long it takes a given message to arrive at its 
intended recipient.  Delays may be likened to routing issues in a given 
network. 
• Reliability — this represents the likelihood that a given message will be 
successfully sent.   
• Accuracy — Indicates the probability that a message sent is received 
correctly by its recipient.  If the message is not received correctly, the 
message is classified as an unknown entity detection.  
• Max Age — Acts as a filter to ensure that stale information does not clog a 
given communication link.   
• Delivery — This discusses the protocol that the network employs.  There are 
two options — send once or send until received.   
The algorithm tab is used to change some of the movement algorithm options.  
The parameters on this panel are trigger state invariant.  MANA employs three different 
algorithms which set the basic rules for agent movement.  Each of the algorithms are 
similar in that they select the grid square within a agents movement range that most 
satisfies its desire to move towards some entities and away from others (as defined in the 
personality tab).  The algorithm assigns a “penalty” for moving in a particular direction 
and the direction which provides the least “penalty” is selected.  If several moves have a 
similarly low penalty, a move is chosen at random form those in the good set.  All 
movements in this analysis utilize the Stephen Algorithm (see MANA users manual for 
more details on this algorithm). 
Other movement settings can be specified in this tab to more closely replicate the 
behavior desired.  Such settings include the ability to have a squad move together.  This 
ensures that the fractional movement for each squad member is the same at each time 
step.  The user can think of this as a parameter to represent squad cohesion.  The ability 
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to have terrain and elevation affect the movement speed is captured by selecting the 
going affects speed block.  For most ground based agents, selecting this option makes 
sense since vehicles, in real life, will not traverse through impassible terrain.  Air based 
agents such as UAVs make a case for unselecting this option.  In other words, the speed 
at which a UAV moves is not hampered by impassible ground terrain.      
The deprecated tab contains parameters which are now obsolete in the version of 
MANA used in this analysis.  The developers of the model have chosen to keep this tab 
to ensure compatibility with previous versions.   
Once all battlefield agents were created using the ideas presented above, the final 
appearance of the battlefield is as depicted in Figure 11 (best when viewed in color).  
This figure can be compared with Figure 5 which indicated the tactical concept that was 
presented with no specific simulation model in mind.  The reader notes the enemy 
positions occupying the high ground overlooking the airfield, and the Blue forces poised 
to begin movement to the attack.  The agents depicted to the far left represent the NLOS 
systems (mortars, cannons and launch systems).  The Blue agents positioned closest to 
the Red forces are the RSV assets conducting reconnaissance forward of the main effort.   
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Figure 11.   MANA Battlefield with all Agents Modeled 
 
The final key portion of the model to be discussed is the ability of the modeler to 
establish stopping conditions.  This is useful for modeling when a particular battle 
“should” end.  Stop conditions allow the model to terminate a run when certain criteria 
are reached.  This is useful to reduce computation time, or to record the run (battle) 
length as a measure of effectiveness (MOE).  This parameter is used in this analysis to 
establish breakpoints for which Blue and Red forces will break contact, or withdraw.  The 
conditions that may be selected are summarized in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12.   Stopping Conditions 
 
D. MODEL SHORTCOMINGS AND “BUGS” 
Over the course of this analysis, the author was challenged to develop “work-
arounds” to model the desired behavior which MANA does not do explicitly.  Three of 
the most significant “work-arounds” are discussed in this section.  In addition, a brief 
description of several model “bugs” which were discovered and fixed by the developers 
as a result of this analysis are presented.       
1. Shortcoming in Modeling Jamming 
The most significant work around developed was encountered when attempting to 
model electronic warfare.  Critical to examining the effects of electronic warfare was the 
ability to sever or degrade communication factors during model run time.  MANA, in its 
pure form, only allows the modeler to set communication effects (range, latency, 
throughput, etc.) at the beginning of each run.  Since the purpose of electronic warfare is 
to reduce or deny the use of portions of the electromagnetic spectrum to an enemy at key 
times of a battle, the scenario had to have the ability to vary the times at which various 
communication links were degraded.  While electronic warfare encompasses many 
different aspects, such as negating certain types of fire control systems and sensors, the 
most common aspect of electronic warfare in ground combat is the jamming of 
communication links.27  
                                                 
27 Puttre, Michael, “International Electronic Countermeasures Handbook,” (Horizon House 
Publications, Inc, Norwood, MA 02062, 2004), pp. 43-56. 
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Jamming techniques fall into two principle types: deception and noise.  Deception 
jamming is mainly a countermeasure used against search and detection radars.  The 
premise is that signals are generated which are similar to the signals expected by the 
radar receiver, but of much higher power.  Deception jammers receive and “memorize” 
the victim’s transmitted signal and, at an appropriate time, retransmit those signals with 
suitable amplitude and phase.  This causes the generation of false targets, forcing the 
victim to commit limited assets to fictitious targets.  While deception jamming is a valid 
threat to mainly air forces, the type of jamming modeled in this scenario falls into the 
second type—noise jamming. 
The object of noise jamming is to introduce disruptive signals into hostile 
electronic equipment so that the wanted signal is obscured.  The victim of this 
disturbance might be a communications network or a datalink, each of which are modeled 
in this scenario.  The effects of this type of jamming range from decreased range of 
transmission, increased latency, and decreased throughput of the link all the way to 
complete degradation of the network.  From previous discussion of the situational 
awareness attributes that MANA models, it is clear that MANA is capable of dynamically 
varying the effects of communication, but it must be done at the beginning of the run.   
To accurately model the effects of noise jamming, the author created 
communication nodes which all Blue forces communicated through.  Each agent has the 
ability to talk through two nodes—a normal communication node (which captures the 
communication equipment’s inherent capabilities while not under jamming) and a 
degraded communication node (which captures the communication equipment’s 
capability when under jamming).  Each of these nodes followed the agents during 
movement.  When the agent desires to communicate with another battlefield agent, it is 
forced to speak through one of the two nodes.  Much like electricity, the agent prefers to 
send its transmission through the path of least resistance, so that under normal 
circumstances (no jamming), the agent uses its normal communication node.  However, 
when the communication link is targeted by an enemy jammer, the agent is now forced to 
use the degraded communication link which has less desirable properties.  This work-
around, while forcing the creation of many additional agents not represented by any real 
world counterpart, effectively models the effects of jamming.        
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2. Dismounting Armored Vehicles 
MANA has no pure way to simulate the dismounting of troops from an armored 
vehicle.  Since one of the key attributes of the FCS is its enhanced mobility to deliver 
combat power to the battle, the ability to simulate delivering dismounts to a place on the 
battlefield is a must.  To accomplish this, the author placed what can best be termed as 
“phantom” dismounted agents at the dismount point where they remained undetected, 
unable to shoot, move or sense until their associated infantry carrier arrived at the 
designated point of the battle.   
This behavior could have been modeled many different ways in MANA, each of 
which are equally plausible.  The method used in this analysis was to have all dismounted 
agents located at the dismount point with the characteristics described above programmed 
for the RUN START trigger state.  Once a friendly agent (ICV) arrived within a certain 
proximity specified by the modeler, the dismounted agents would revert to the 
DEFAULT trigger state where all weapons, sensors and other abilities were activated.  
This provides a very clean way to model the effect of delivering dismounts to the 
battlefield. 
3. Unit Level UAV Activation 
The FCS has significant UAV assets, as described in Chapter II.  Many of these 
UAV assets are smaller, vertical take off units that have the ability to be emplaced by an 
operational unit at the point in the battle which it is most advantageous for that unit to do 
so.  One operational example of this in the given scenario is when the RSV elements are 
conducting their reconnaissance.  Since all UAVs (and other mounted systems for that 
matter) are bounded by the amount of fuel that they have, they have a limited range or 
corresponding duration associated with the platform.   The RSV would most likely 
choose to preserve the duration that the UAV would have until it has maneuvered into the 
reconnaissance area.  This would allow for greater unmanned coverage of the battlespace, 
a desirable characteristic.   
To simulate this timely UAV activation, an identical approach was employed as 
described with the dismounting of armored vehicles.  The scenario employs “phantom” 
UAVs which are activated when their associated controller comes within a certain 
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proximity.  This provides yet another clean way to model the effect of saving critical 
UAV range for surveillance of the objective.   
4. “Bugs” in MANA 
While every effort has been made by the developers of MANA and the author to 
ensure that the program was free of computational and logic errors, the model cannot be 
claimed to be verified or validated.  The opening screen of MANA contains the 
disclaimer that it is a BETA version for scientific and research purposes only.  The 
author’s definition for a beta version is a program that is not quite ready to be released, 
but one which the programmer/author solicits user commentary to uncover programming 
and logic errors.  With the many users of MANA worldwide, over the course of this 
analysis, the author saw more than 10 different versions of MANA implemented, 
primarily fixing user discovered bugs.  In a recent discussion with the MANA 
developers, they indicated that they do not believe that the model is completely free of 
errors, but with user validation for the scenario they are running, the model can provide 
insights that would otherwise remain undiscovered.   
Two such “bugs” were submitted by the author which were critical to the proper 
running of the scenario at hand.  The first bug involved a simple saving problem in which 
direct fire (Kinetic Energy) weapons would not save the shot radius properly.  This 
affected RPG weapons by diminishing their effect.  This bug was readily diagnosed by 
the developers and a repaired version sent out within a week of the report.   
The second bug was a bit more complicated in that the model did not properly 
model weapons which are organic to armored vehicles.  As indicated in Chapter II of this 
thesis, FCS armor forces—particularly the MCS—have two main weapon systems.  One 
is intended to destroy other armored targets, and the other weapon system is designed to 
destroy personnel.  MANA indicates that it has the ability to do this through the settings 
on the range tabs when creating agents.   
When testing the scenario, the author found that while these settings prevented an 
armored agent from being killed by a weapon system that was not designed to destroy 
armor (rifles, artillery, etc.), armored agents were also prevented from destroying 
“armorless” targets with their close support weapon system.   When submitted to the 
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model developers, once again, the problem was diagnosed and a repaired version of the 
model was sent out in a short order.  The ability to communicate directly with the 
software developers to report possible problems with the model made MANA an easy 






IV. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The analyst’s role is not to provide the answer but…to provide 
illumination and visibility—to expose some problem in terms that are as 
simple as possible 
Lieutenant General Glen Kent 
This chapter explains the analysis methodology, designs and statistical tools used 
to explore communications and FCS effectiveness in MANA.  The objectives are to 
develop analytic models which describe the output data in order to draw conclusions 
concerning the effect that communications plays in the effectiveness of the FCS.  Any 
models, therefore, must be able to present findings in a tractable manner.  This chapter 
also devotes some time toward the development of measures of effectiveness—the 
benchmark that determines levels of success or failure of the FCS.  Statistical tools and 
techniques are also introduced, but left for the reader to explore if further information is 
desired. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Simulations (and Agent-Based Models in particular) are designed to allow 
decision makers to quickly explore the consequences of tactical decisions.  In this case, 
since the FCS has recently moved into the system design and development stage of 
acquisition, this may include ensuring that the proper communication characteristics are 
achieved to ensure mission accomplishment.  To do this requires testing a given scenario 
over many different values of the parameters of interest.  Since many models are 
stochastic (or variable) in nature, replication over a given set of parameter values is 
required to gain insight into the variability of the outcomes. 
 The parameters of interest in this analysis morphed from the initial bias and 
military experience of the author as the analysis progressed.  Initially, communication 
factors including network latency, throughput, reliability, time filtering of messages 
(ensuring current or valid information is sent), and range were thought to be the only 
factors of interest.  Further thought on the subject revealed that Blue force tactical 
decisions, such as when to commit to the ground offensive and how to employ unmanned 
systems, may also have a profound effects on casualties and time of battle.   
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In addition, it became clear that the enemy also has a hand in the effectiveness of 
the FCS.  A smart enemy may choose to use EW assets, and has the capability to 
determine the time at which to use those assets.  The defensive preparedness (how 
fortified defensive positions are) of the enemy may have a direct impact on the battle 
outcome as well.  Even with these limited factors, it can be shown that an exhaustive 
examination of all combinations of these factors, even at a limited number of levels, 
would result in an untenable experimental design. 
To give an example, if only 10 of the factors described above were to be 
examined at five levels, there are 510 number of runs (almost ten million) required to 
obtain results on a single experiment at each input combination.  To capture the 
variability of these runs through even modest replication of twenty replications per design 
point, requires 200 million runs.  While agent-based models are designed for quick run 
time (the scenario implemented in this analysis takes about one minute to run a single 
replication on a 1.5 GHz Pentium© 4 processor.)  Thus, these 200 million runs would 
take approximately 371 years to complete—of course, by then the analysis would be 
obsolete.  Even this analysis, if completed in a reasonable amount of time with hundreds 
of processors running, may not sample the “correct” areas of interest.   
One of the pioneers in developing methods to examine effects of many factors 
over many levels is the U.S. Marine Corps Project Albert initiative.  Project Albert is the 
research and development effort of the Marine Corps whose goal is to develop the 
process and capabilities of Data Farming, a method to address decision-maker's questions 
that applies high performance computing to modeling in order to examine and understand 
the landscape of potential simulated outcomes, enhance intuition, find surprises and 
outliers, and identify potential options.28  
Data Farming is the method by which potentially millions of data points are 
explored and captured. It could be considered akin to Data Mining combined with 
feedback which allows for the more intelligent collection of more data points. This 
process is made possible, in part, by the exploitation of high performance computing 
assets and methods. The Project Albert modeling approach is achieved through the 
                                                 
28 Project Albert Description, retrieved 15 May, 2004 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/divisions/albert/index.asp. 
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development of a suite of models, such as MANA.  It is clear that even with high 
performance computing, a smart experimental design must be used in order to aid the 
analyst in ensuring a wide sampling of many factors over many levels.      
B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The previous section described one method of exploring factors at various levels 
known as the full factorial design.  Full factorial designs, as indicated, exhaustively look 
at all combinations of variables at all combinations of levels.  These gridded designs are 
particularly useful for looking at a modest number of factors at a limited amount of 
levels,29 however, this method is often infeasible when factors and levels are numerous, 
due to run-time restrictions.  Significant work has been exerted in the development of 
“smart” designs which sample many values of many factors while maintaining good 
analytic properties.   
One such design is called the Latin Hypercube.  Latin Hypercubes, and the Nearly 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) designs in particular, are the experimental design 
of choice in this analysis.  Thomas Cioppa, in his PhD dissertation, discusses this branch 
of experimental designs.30  His work shows that when the analyst is required to search an 
intricate simulation model that has a high-dimensional input space characterized by a 
complex response surface, the NOLH designs are well suited.  NOLH designs are 
characterized by: 
• Approximate orthogonality of input factors (uncorrelated inputs) 
• Good space filling (i.e. design points are scattered throughout the 
experimental region with minimal unsampled regions). 
• The ability to examine many variables efficiently. 
• Flexibility in analyzing and estimating many effects, interactions and 
thresholds. 
• Requires minimal a priori assumptions on the response. 
                                                 
29 Lucas, p. 23. 
30 Cioppa, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M., Efficient Nearly Orthogonal and Space-Filling 
Experimental Designs for High-Dimensional Complex Models, (PhD. Dissertation, Operations Research 
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA), 2002. 
 50 
A more thorough and technically complete discussion on these experimental designs can 
be obtained in Cioppa’s dissertation.    
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
To focus the analysis, two main MOEs were chosen to represent the relative 
“success” of a combined arms battalion of the Future Force.  An MOE represents an 
objective, quantitative expression of performance appropriate to the context in which it is 
being used.  As indicated by Appleget, two key measures used in the FCS AoA included 
the time to accomplish the mission and the number of Blue losses. 31   
The time to accomplish the mission represents the speed at which the Blue force 
exacts a certain amount of attrition on the enemy.  All experiments in this analysis 
examined this time as a factor of the point (in terms of their own casualties) at which the 
Red forces broke contact.  Of course, the point at which the Red force makes this 
determination is variable in its own right, so each experiment was conducted at two 
nominal values of a determined enemy—when they receive 50 percent and 75 percent 
casualties.  These values assume a very determined and disciplined enemy that 
understands the criticality of their mission.   
The number of Blue losses indicates a shift in the post Vietnam War measure of 
tracking enemy “body counts” to the number of U.S. servicemen losses.  A casual look at 
what is reported on U.S. news networks reveals a near non-existent reporting of enemy 
casualties, however, the loss of a single U.S. serviceman to enemy fire is front page news.  
Any tactical or equipment procurement decision must take into account the risk to U.S. 
servicemen.   Both of these measures are readily available in MANA. 
D. EXPERIMENTAL SETS 
Three experimental sets are examined in this analysis.  They are presented in 
detail below. 
1. Experimental Set 1—No EW Case 
The first experimental set sought to examine the first two analysis questions, 
which are: 
                                                 
31 Appleget, p. 15. 
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• What characteristics of communications are imperative and at what levels 
are they significant for a combined arms battalion of the Army’s Future 
Force employed in the attack? 
• How do network latency, range, reliability and throughput affect the 
Future Force’s ability to fight and win decisively? 
This experimental set can be considered the baseline case that examines how 
variations in the communication factors affect the performance of the Blue forces.  These 
runs assume that the enemy does not possess EW or chooses not to use this capability.  In 
keeping with the spirit of agent-based models, this analysis begins by examining a large 
number of variables and distilling these variables as analysis indicates significance to the 
overall problem.  The final variables are selected based on these many pre-production 
runs focusing the analysis.  The final MANA simulation was run exploring seven 
communication factors and two tactical decision factors at two designated enemy 
breakpoints.  The levels were chosen by using military experience and judgement from 
many small interactive experiments.  The ten variables and the ranges examined are 
presented below with the corresponding MANA variable in parenthesis.  A summary of 
these values (in terms of MANA converted values) is shown in Table 5. 
• Latency—(Latency) from a delay a few seconds to a few minutes. 
• Range—(Range) from the ability to communicate over the entire 
battlespace to a diminished range of 50 percent of the battlespace. 
• Reliability—(Reliability) from 100 percent reliable to a network that was 
only 50 percent reliable. 
• Throughput—(Capacity) from a nearly infinite capacity (bandwidth) to a 
capacity which made electronic communications nearly non-existent. 
• Filtering mechanism—(Max Information Age) from allowing only the 
most current information to allowing even very stale information to pass 
through the network.   
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• Buffer Size—(Queue Buffer Size) representing the hardware’s ability to 
store messages until they can be sent, ranging from a very large buffer to a 
very small buffer. 
• Method of Transmission—(Guaranteed Delivery or Fire and Forget) 
representing the option to send the message once or send until received. 
• Early UAV Employment—(UAV Ideal Enemy / Run Start Trigger State) 
establishes the priority of UAV effort early in the battle to one of four 
categories: dismounted infantry, air defense assets, mortars, or armor.   
• Late UAV Employment—(UAV Ideal Enemy / Default Trigger State) 
establishes the priority of UAV effort late in the battle to one of the same 
four categories discussed above. 
• Enemy Breakpoint—(Red Stopping Condition) evaluated at 50 percent 
and 75 percent casualties. 





Max Info Age 1 50
Queue Buffer Size 0 200
GD or F&F Yes No
Early UAV Effort 1 4
Late UAV Effort 1 4
Enemy Breakpoint 48 72  
Table 5. Factor and Level Summary for Experiment 1. 
 
Using a NOLH design with nine factors evaluated at both enemy breakpoints (132 
design points) and 35 replications per design point, time of battle and Blue force 
casualties are examined.  The desire is to provide insight on which communications 





2. Experimental Set 2—Enemy EW Case 
The second experimental set seeks to examine the third analysis question, which 
is: 
• How do network attacks (complete and partial degradation) and the Future 
Force’s ability to respond to the attacks hamper fighting ability?  
This experiment expands on the first, however this experiment assumes that the 
enemy force both possesses EW and chooses to use that capability.  To represent the 
decisions that the enemy has, the time and duration at which the enemy uses EW is 
examined.  The time that EW is employed can have a profound effect based on the 
communications reliance of Blue weapon systems at a particular point in the battle.  The 
duration of EW takes into account the fact that the U.S. military has redundant means of 
communication, but any shift in means of communications will require time to 
implement. 
The second experimental set was run exploring the ten factors described in the 
first experiment along with two additional factors i.e. the time of EW and duration of 
EW.  The levels were chosen to account for enemy employment of EW through all 
phases of the Blue force attack and the spectrum of Blue response to that EW.  The two 
additional variables and the ranges examined are presented below with the corresponding 
MANA variables in parenthesis.  A summary of these values (in terms of MANA 
converted values) is shown in Table 6. 
• Time of EW—(Jammer Duration Run Start Trigger State) from battle 
commencement to well into the dismounted ground offensive. 
• Duration of EW—(Jammer Duration Spare 1 Trigger State) from near 









Max Info Age 1 50
Queue Buffer Size 0 200
GD or F&F Yes No
Early UAV Effort 1 4
Late UAV Effort 1 4
Duration of EW 100 600
Time of EW 10 500
Enemy Breakpoint 48 72  
Table 6. Factor and Level Summary for Experiment 2. 
 
Using a NOLH design with eleven factors evaluated at both enemy breakpoints 
(132 design points) and 35 replications per design point, time of battle and Blue force 
casualties are examined.  The goal is to provide insight on which communications factors 
are significant to the Blue forces and how the enemy interdiction of the communications 
hampers mission accomplishment.   
3. Experimental Set 3—Most Critical Communication Link 
The final experimental set seeks to examine the fourth analysis question, which 
was: 
• If destroyed or hampered, which communication link(s) most affect the 
Future Force in terms of mission accomplishment?  
This experimental set changes the focus from conducting operations in a degraded 
communications environment to conducting operations in an environment where 
complete degredation is experienced in a particular battlefield operating system.  To 
examine this, additional MANA agents are created to achieve the effect of completely 
severing a particular communication link.  Blue forces are aggregated into three main 
categories: UAVs, armor assets, and dismounted forces.  Enemy jammers then target only 
specific communication links of these categories.  The activation times of each jammer 
are then varied to examine the effectiveness of the Blue forces.   
As described in experimental set two, to represent the decisions that the enemy 
has, the time at which the enemy used EW to sever a particular communication link is 
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examined.  The final experimental set is run exploring three factors of the time of EW for 
each of the three categories.  The levels are chosen to account for enemy employment of 
EW through all phases of the Blue force attack.  Once a communication link is severed, it 
is assumed unrecoverable to Blue forces.  The variables and the ranges examined are 
presented below with the corresponding MANA variables in parenthesis. 
• Time of EW—(Jammer Duration Run Start Trigger State) from battle 
commencement to well into the dismounted ground offensive.  This is 
implemented for the UAV, armor and dismounted jammers. 
Factor Lower Value Upper Value
Time of Dismounted EW 1 800
Time of Armor EW 1 800
Time of UAV EW 1 800
Enemy Breakpoint 48 72  
Table 7. Factor and Level Summary for Experiment 3. 
 
Using three stacked orthogonal Latin hypercube designs with three factors 
evaluated at both enemy breakpoints (102 design points) and 35 replications per design 
point, time of battle and Blue force casualties are examined.  The goal is to provide 
insight on which communications link is most significant to the Blue forces.   
E. STATISTICAL TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
At this point, the model has been described, MOEs defined, factors determined at 
their appropriate levels, and the experimental designs fixed.  Once these items have been 
combined to yield the output of the model, the analyst must determine methods to 
evaluate the results.  This section outlines the methods and procedures used in this 
analysis to draw conclusions from the data.   
While there are many analysis techniques that could have been applied to the 
output datasets, this analysis concentrates primarily on four main techniques: graphical 
analysis, multiple regression, regression trees and classification trees.  All of these 
techniques can be considered complimentary in nature, each yielding insights about the 
data in their own right.   
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1. Graphical Analysis 
Graphical analysis is probably the least technical of all analysis methods, 
requiring no assumptions about the data.  It involves simply plotting aspects of the data to 
uncover insights on the behavior.  It has been said that “a picture is worth a thousand 
words” and this is certainly true in this application.  Graphics can provide insights 
interpretable by audiences without an analysis background, particularly useful in the 
military environment when conveying results to a tactical commander.   
2. Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression is the standard technique for assessing how various predictors 
(inputs) relate to a response.  One subset of multiple regression is linear regression which 
is used to describe the effect of continuous or categorical variables upon a continuous 
response.  The linear regression model assumes that the response is obtained by taking 
specific linear combinations of the coefficients of the predictors and adding random 
variation (error).  The error is assumed to have a Gaussian (normal) distribution with 
constant variance and independent of the predictor values.32  Regression is useful for 
determining which predictor variables have an effect on the output, and is the primary 
means to determine which communication factors are significant to the FCS.   
3. Regression and Classification Trees 
The basic principal of tree models is to partition (in a recursive manner) the space 
spanned by the input variables to maximize a score of class “purity.”33  Purity, roughly 
speaking, means that the majority of points in each cell of a partition belong to a similar 
class.  Each partition may have additional splits to increase the purity of the previous 
split, thus giving the analyst an idea of the importance of the factors.  Factors which 
increase the purity most are “most” important and subsequent splits are “less” important.  
In addition, this can give indication to the levels at which the factors are important.  Tree 
models have fewer requirements on the underlying assumptions concerning the output  
                                                 
32 Hand, David, Heikki Mannila and Padhraic Smyth, Principles of Data Mining, (The MIT press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001), p. 367-289. 
33 Hand, p. 343. 
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data and for this reason are often very useful analytic tools for exploring the relationships 
in the output data.  Trees can highlight where the relationships of significant factors 
occurred.34   
The basic difference between regression and classification trees is that a 
regression tree yields a continuous output while classification trees predict a categorical 
output.  In this analysis, a regression tree was used to yield a prediction on the time of 
battle or number of Blue casualties, based on partitions, and was used primarily to 
confirm the most important factors discovered using multiple regression.  In this analysis, 
classification trees are used to predict whether the battle takes a “short,” “medium,” or 
“long” period of time or if casualties are “low,” “medium,” or “high.”    This gives 
insights on the level that a specific factor becomes important to yielding a short battle or 
minimal casualties.   
F. SOFTWARE USED IN THIS STUDY 
To attempt to conduct any parametric analysis of any sort would be a near 
impossible task without the aid of statistical software.  This section briefly discusses the 
packages used to arrive at conclusions drawn from the data.   
1. JMP Statistical Discovery Software™ 
JMP was chosen as the platform to conduct a majority of the data analysis.  JMP 
is a product of the SAS Institute® and is advertised as a software package for interactive 
statistical graphics.35  JMP includes: 
• A spreadsheet for viewing, editing, entering and manipulating data. 
• A broad range of built in statistical and model building menus to simplify 
analysis. 
• Extensive graphics capability to quickly generate the most commonly used 
statistical inference graphics.   
• Simple and intuitive point-and-click interface.  
• Extensive help library to assist with interpretation of analysis products.  
                                                 
34 Brown, Objective Force Urban Operations Agent Based Simulation Experiment, p. 15. 
35 JMP Introductory Guide, Version 5, (SAS Institute Inc.,Cary NC. 2002) p. 1. 
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While JMP is limited in some respects when performing non-standard analysis (to which 
other packages are more robust), it provides sufficient capability to examine the data with 
the techniques desired for this analysis.   
2. Clementine® 
Clementine is a data mining application.  Data mining offers a strategic approach 
to finding useful relationships in moderate to large data sets.  In contrast to more 
traditional statistical methods, the user does not necessarily need to know what they are 
looking for when starting the analysis.  Data can be explored, fitting different models and 
investigating different relationships until useful information is found.36  The Clementine 
interface makes data exploration relatively easy.  The interface allows the user to drag 
various nodes onto the operating palette to manipulate the data.  Nodes are connected 
together to form streams which, when executed, let the user visualize relationships and 
draw conclusions.  In this thesis, classification and regression trees are created using 
Clementine to confirm results from JMP.   
                                                 
36 Clementine Product Description, Clementine Data Mining System Version 8.0, (SPSS Inc., 2000) 
retrieved on May 13, 2004 from the world wide web at http://www.spss.com/clementine.   
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V. DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter outlines the significant findings and methods used to arrive at 
conclusions.  It is presented in three sections: data collected, pre-production observations 
and thesis question-based observations.  The section on data collected outlines how 
pertinent items were extracted from the raw data used for future data analysis.  Pre-
production observations present some of the “intuitive” findings of the analysis and show 
why certain factors were omitted in production run simulations.  The thesis question- 
based observations present analysis which drove the conclusions presented in Chapter VI.  
This section is ordered in the same manner as the research questions were posed.   
A. DATA COLLECTION AND CLEANING 
For each experimental set, the simulation output data consists of many 
observations and several measures of effectiveness.  Many of these measures are not 
useful for the analysis at hand (such as squad by squad breakdown of casualties).  Prior to 
any analysis, the data set must be pared down to contain only the input factors to be 
examined and the desired measures of effectiveness.   
As previously discussed, MANA is a stochastic simulation which, by nature, 
yields a distribution of outcomes for a set of input parameters.  This variability can be 
very large in some circumstances.  Fitting a model with highly variable data often leads 
to poorly fit models which may be scrutinized by those in the field of data analysis when 
drawing conclusions.  In an attempt to create better fitting models without losing the core 
information, replication between design points is aggregated into a single measure of 
centrality.   
Two main measures are often used: the average and the median of the outcomes.  
The median is a method that is useful when significant outliers exist.  This non-
parametric measure simply rank orders all observations and selects the observation that 
lies in the middle.  Another measure is the average.  The average is the measure used in 
this analysis.  While it can be shown that in most cases in this analysis, both measures are 
the nearly the same, the average is a term that is widely known and appeals to the 
knowledge base of those who may not have an extensive statistics background.  Using the 
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average in this type of analysis yields (somewhat artificially) a higher R2 value, but also 
allows the analyst to pick up factors which otherwise might have been missed if 
aggregation is not used.     
To effectively use the average as a measure of centrality, it must first be shown 
that significant outliers do not exist for outcomes and second to show that a majority of 
the outcomes lie around that average value.  Both of these characteristics are 
demonstrated by a histogram of output values and its corresponding QQ plot.37  Ideally, 
one hopes to see a distribution of outcomes that resemble the Gaussian or Normal 
distribution.  Selecting any design point (combination of input factors) from the data set 
and plotting the outcomes of that design point in a histogram roughly demonstrates this 
relationship.  One such design point is shown in Figure 13 below.  The reader notes the 
bell-shaped curve which resembles a Normal Distribution.  Its corresponding QQ plot 









Figure 13.   Histogram and Corresponding QQ Plot of One Design Point 
 
To analytically confirm intuition about the graphical observation of normality, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality may be conducted.38  These results are posed in a 
hypothesis test setting, where the null hypothesis is that the distribution comes from a 
                                                 
37 Hamilton, Lawrence C. Regression With Graphics, A Second Course in Applied Statistics, (Duxbury 
Press, Belmont, CA 94002, 1992), p. 13-15. 
38 Conover, W.J. Practical Nonparametric Statistics, Third Edition, (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New 
York, 1999), p. 450. 
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normal distribution.  Conducting this test yields a p-value of 0.65, indicating strong 
evidence that the null hypothesis of the data’s normality should not be rejected.  These 
results are typical for most input combinations examined. 
B. PRE-PRODUCTION RUN OBSERVATIONS 
Analysis is often an iterative process that is adjusted to examine the questions of 
interest.  This is certainly the case in this analysis.  Initially, the author thought that 
including every possible factor that might have an effect on the FCS effectiveness would 
be the “best” way to tackle the problem at hand.  It became evident early on, however, 
that in order to examine the communication questions posed, the factors examined must 
be pared down as insights are uncovered.  Several factors such as the time at which the 
Blue forces commit to the dismounted ground offensive, enemy fortification and a large 
range of enemy breakpoints are removed from production runs to uncover 
communication insights.  The main reason for omission is that these factors tend to 
overwhelm the importance of communication factors examined and make them less 
significant.          
“Infantry must move forward to close with the enemy.” 
General George S. Patton 
1. Committing to the Dismounted Offensive 
In this pre-production experimental set, the time at which the Blue forces commit 
to the dismounted offensive is varied from very early in the battle to very late in the 
battle. Other communication factors are also varied with the goal of uncovering the 
significance of communications factors.  This “drowning out” of the communication 
factors can be seen by examining a multiple regression model that shows the relative 
importance of factors.  The model takes into account all main effects (no interactions) 
and shows that even with a well-fit model (adjusted R2 of 0.88), the effect of committing 
to the ground offensive (Time of Phase II) is nearly an order of magnitude larger in 
importance than its nearest communication factor: communication range (CommRange).   
This relative importance of the factors manifests itself in the Sum of Squares 
(SoS) computation shown in Figure 14.  The sum of squares indicates the amount of 
variability that the factor of interest accounts for.  A large value indicates significance to 
 62 
the fit of the model.    Since the objective of this analysis is to determine the importance 
of communication factors, the time to commit to the dismounted offensive is omitted 
from future experimental sets with the intent of amplifying communication effects in 
future analysis.  This however brings an important tactical insight to light, namely, that 
even with modern technology, leadership decisions critically affect battles.  Additionally, 
the insight of allowing the NLOS to exact as much attrition as possible prior to 
committing dismounted forces is noted and examined in further detail.   
 
Figure 14.   Tests of Main Effects (Linear Regression Model Fit) 
 
Many pre-production runs show that if the Blue forces commit to the dismounted 
offensive late in the battle, they receive fewer casualties; however, the time of battle is 
much longer.  This leads to the question, why commit to the dismounted ground offensive 
at all?  Observing the simulation during run time reveals that if the NLOS systems are 
given longer to attrite the enemy forces, they are, in effect, “softened” up and offer less 
resistance to the dismounts, thereby decreasing the overall Blue casualties.  While a 
tactical commander might be tempted to continue the NLOS offensive for long periods, 
often times, commanders are bound by time and logistic constraints to ensure 
coordination with other units.   
The reader may recall that the Blue forces had the mission of destroying enemy in 
their area of operations in order to facilitate follow-on movement and operations in 
theater.  If the unit is not able to destroy enemy air defenses prior to air insertion of 
follow-on forces, a single enemy air defense missile might completely destroy an 
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incoming troop carrying aircraft, significantly increasing Blue casualties.  Time to 
complete a battle is a significant military factor that cannot be ignored.   
To examine the tactical question of the “correct” duration of the NLOS fight, 
several smaller runs were executed to determine the effectiveness of the NLOS systems.  
Essentially, these mini-experiments look at the Red casualty results if only 
reconnaissance assets (UAVs and RSVs) are committed to locate the enemy and feed this 
information to the NLOS to “win” the battle.  What we see is that there is a point of 
diminishing returns on the NLOS.  After a certain period of time, the NLOS are unable to 
finish the enemy.  These results are summarized below in Figure 15.   












0 1 2 3 4 5 6















Figure 15.   NLOS and Reconnaissance Assets Only (Enemy Attrition Over Time) 
 
Figure 15 indicates that if NLOS are the only “killer” team employed, they would not 
exact even 50 percent attrition on the enemy after six hours of continuous fighting.  In 
short, NLOS cannot win the battle alone.  It should also be noted that in this 
configuration, the Blue forces suffered only one casualty, a UAV which was shot down 
by enemy fire.   
 As a comparison, when committing to the dismounted ground offensive after the 
NLOS have exacted some attrition, the following results are noted.  While Blue forces 
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receive casualties at a much higher rate than the NLOS fight alone, the rate at which Blue 
forces attrite the Red forces is also much higher.  Figure 16 (best when viewed in color) 
shows an example of this.   
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Figure 16.   All FCS Assets (Enemy and Friendly Attrition Over Time) 
 
The old adage of “nothing ventured, nothing gained” comes to mind when 
viewing Figure 16.  This figure indicates that when Blue dismounts are committed to the 
battle (around two hours into the battle), the rate at which Blue takes casualties increases 
significantly, however, so does the rate of Red casualties.  This shows that a finishing 
force must be committed by the Blue forces to ensure a decisive victory.   
2. Enemy Fortification Effects 
As one might expect, an enemy who is well prepared and dug in is a much more 
difficult enemy to fight.  In MANA, the fortification level of the enemy is quite easily 
modeled by increasing or decreasing weapons effectiveness of Blue systems on that 
enemy.  Much like the example provided above, including enemy defensive preparation 
in the analysis tends to “drown out” any significance of communications in the battle.  
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In this experiment, the enemy fortification levels are varied from a hasty defense, 
where very little protection is offered to the enemy, to scenarios where the enemy is well 
dug in and obscured from Blue detection.  Results indicate that if the enemy is well 
prepared and fortified, Blue casualties are substantially higher than that of an enemy who 
is only hastily prepared.  In addition, battles tend to be longer for a well prepared enemy.   
To demonstrate the “drowning out” of the communication factors, multiple 
regression is again used to show the relative importance of factors.  The model takes into 
account all main effects (no interactions) and shows that even with a well-fit model 
(adjusted R2 of 0.98), the effect of enemy fortification (Enemy Fortification) is nearly 
three orders of magnitude larger in importance than its nearest communication factor: 
communication range (CommRange).  The SoS results are shown in Figure 17.   Once 
again, since the objective of this analysis is to determine the importance of 
communication factors, the level at which the enemy is prepared is omitted from future 
analysis with the intent of amplifying communication effects in future analysis.   
 
Figure 17.   Tests of Main Effects (Linear Regression Model Fit) 
 
Figure 17 indicates that a model which includes only the factor of Enemy Fortification 
almost exclusively describes the outcome of a battle.  It is worth noting that, in this 
scenario, communication factors are a second order effect.   
3. Enemy Breakpoint Effects 
As has been shown in the previous two examples, non-communication related 
effects can have a significant effect on a battle outcome.  While important in their own 
rite to a battlefield commander, when examining the communications questions at hand, 
care must be taken to ensure that the desired factors are analyzed.  Another factor 
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examined is enemy breakpoint.  Early experiments show that, much like the previous two 
examples, when enemy breakpoint is varied over a wide range of values, this factor tends 
to dissolve the importance of communications in the battle.   
In this experiment, the enemy breakpoint is varied from 30 percent to 75 percent.  
This represents the determination of the enemy to hold the ground that they were directed 
to. Results show that if the enemy breaks contact early in the battle, Blue casualties tend 
to be much lower than when the enemy fights longer.  In addition, when the enemy fights 
longer, the battles tend to be longer.   
A multiple regression model is created to assess the relative importance of factors.  
The model takes into account all main effects (no interactions) and shows that even with 
a well-fit model, (adjusted R2 of 0.91) the effect of enemy breakpoint (Enemy 
Breakpoint) is nearly three orders of magnitude larger in importance than its nearest 
communication factor: queue buffer size (Queue Buffer Size).  The SoS results are shown 
in Figure 18.   Since the objective of this analysis is to determine the importance of 
communication factors, the level at which the enemy breaks contact is only evaluated at 
two representative values in the final experiments.   
 
Figure 18.   Tests of Main Effects (Linear Regression Model Fit) 
 
Figure 18 indicates that a model which includes a factor of Red Breakpoint diminishes 
any communication significance.  
4. Summary of Pre-Production Observations 
Despite the overwhelming of communications importance, each of the pre-
production experimental sets uncover important tactical insights important to a tactical 
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commander.  The first set indicates that the increased lethality of the FCS NLOS assets 
provides a capability that must be allowed to attrite the enemy as long as possible.  This, 
however, must be balanced with time constraints.  In addition, it must be noted that even 
with this increased lethality, NLOS alone cannot win the battle.  The second set shows 
that an enemy that is well fortified requires more effort to destroy.  The final set shows 
the importance of non-traditional military assets such as psychological operations in 
diminishing the enemy’s will to fight.  An enemy who loses his will to fight early in the 
battle will result in a less bloody battle that will cease hostilities much quicker.   To 
summarize, leadership, enemy defensive posture, and the enemy’s will to fight are more 
important than any marginal technical factors.   
C. THESIS QUESTION BASED ANALYSIS 
Armed with pre-production analysis observations, experimental sets as detailed in 
Chapter IV were conducted.  Each of the data sets are analyzed using both MOEs and 
various methods to determine the significance of communications effects on the battle 
outcome.  The following observations are presented. 
1. Communication Characteristics and Levels of Significance Analysis 
The heart of the analysis lies in developing insights into how systems should be 
designed to ensure a capable FCS force.  The first two analysis questions that we are 
seeking to uncover insights for are: 
• What characteristics of communications are imperative and at what levels are 
they significant for a combined arms battalion of the Army’s Future Force 
employed in the attack? 
• How do network latency, range, reliability, and throughput affect the Future 
Force’s ability to fight and win decisively? 
The first experimental set was used to examine these questions.  Recall that this 
experimental set varies seven communication factors and two tactical employment factors 
(UAV employment focus) at two representative enemy breakpoints under conditions of 
no EW.  Conducting multiple regression on all main effects, two term interactions and 
quadratic effects using Blue casualties as the response yields the following model shown 
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Figure 19.   No EW Regression Model (50% Enemy Breakpoint / Blue Casualty MOE) 
 
Figure 19 shows the fitted model based on the regression analysis.  Ideally, the 
data points would fall along the Red centerline or the line of fit.  The distance from each 
point to the line of fit is the error or residual for that point.  The adjusted R2 for this 
model, indicating how well the model fits the data, is 0.73, indicating a fairly good fit for 
this type of model.  The significant factors and interactions that have the largest effect in 
this regression analysis are shown in Table 8. 
Factor Sum of Squares 
Range 1145.02 
Latency 311.04 
Latency / Range Interaction 251.82 
Capacity 141.84 
Reliability 113.16 
Table 8. Significant Factors (No EW 50% Enemy Breakpoint / Blue Casualty MOE) 
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Conducting similar analysis on this data set, using the time of battle as the 
response once again leads to a fairly well-fit model (adjusted R2 of 0.73).  The significant 
factors and interactions that have the largest effect in this regression analysis are shown 
in Table 9. 





Range / Capacity Interaction 3095.31 
Latency / Range Interaction 2491.45 
Table 9. Significant Factors (No EW 50% Enemy Breakpoint / Time of Battle MOE) 
 
Prior to drawing any conclusions about the results of the regression analysis, it 
makes sense to compare the results when the enemy breakpoint is set at 75 percent.  
Conducting a linear regression on all main effects, two term interactions and quadratic 
effects when evaluated at 75 percent enemy breakpoint and using Blue casualties as the 
MOE yields a fairly well-fit model (adjusted R2 of 0.68).  The significant factors and 
interactions that have the largest effect in this regression analysis are shown in Table 10. 




Latency / Range Interaction 236.41 
Range / Capacity Interaction 178.51 
Reliability 137.51 
Table 10. Significant Factors (No EW 75% Enemy Breakpoint / Blue Casualty MOE) 
 
Conducting similar analysis on this data set, using the time of battle as the 
response once again leads to a fairly well-fit model (adjusted R2 of 0.63).  The significant 
factors and interactions that have the largest effect in this regression analysis are shown 
in Table 11. 
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Latency / Range Interaction 21329.51 
Reliability 12574.40 
Reliability / Capacity Interaction 10511.16 
Table 11. Significant Factors (No EW 75% Enemy Breakpoint / Time of Battle MOE) 
 
Aggregating these results into a single table which shows the prominence of 
factors examined in these data sets, helps to detect recurring patterns in the analyses.  
Table 12 records the number of times a specific factor appeared in the four regression 
analyses.   





Latency / Range Interaction 4 
Range / Capacity Interaction 2 
Reliability / Capacity Interaction 1 
Table 12. Aggregation of Significant Factors (No EW / All MOEs & Enemy Breakpoints) 
 
The overlap of significant factors gives insight concerning the importance of the 
factors.   The fact that range, latency, capacity, reliability and the interaction between 
latency and range occurred in all data sets using both MOEs is noteworthy.  This suggests 
that these factors could be the prominent communication factors which have an effect on 
the effectiveness of the FCS.   Further intuition suggests that since range and latency are 
the “top two” factors in all four models, suggests that we can refine this finding further to 
say that range and latency are the “most” important communication factors in this 
scenario.   
Observing leverage plots of range and latency uncovers insights as to the 
relationship of these factors.39  Figure 20 (best when viewed in color) indicates that as 
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range is increased (representing an increased ability to communicate over the entire 
battlespace) and as latency is decreased (representing the characteristic of an efficient 
network) one could expect that the time of battle (and Blue casualties) are decreased.  
This would serve to confirm one’s intuition that adding increased communications 











Figure 20.   Leverage Plots of Range and Latency Effects 
 
Noting that there is a prominent interaction as well in the “top” communication 
effects warrants further examination.  The interaction between range and latency can best 
be described through an interaction plot.40  The interaction plot graphically portrays the 
relationship between the two factors.  As shown in Figure 21, when latency is high, 
(representing slow communications) range does not play a significant role in determining 
the battle outcome.  However, when the network is very responsive, (low latency) the 
ability to communicate over the entire battlespace is very significant.  In other words, if 
the network is too slow to respond to current intelligence concerning the enemy, the 
range of communications doesn’t matter.  (By the time the intelligence is received by the 
“killer” team, the enemy has relocated and any fires brought upon that enemy are 
exhausted in vain.) 
                                                 
40 JMP Statistics and Graphics Guide, p. 244. 
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Figure 21.   Interaction Plots of Range and Latency     
 
Feeling confident that these data sets have uncovered insights as to the 
significance of communications factors, further analysis is required to examine the levels 
at which these factors are important.  To examine this question, regression and 
classification trees are constructed on the non-aggregated data.  Guided by the regression 


































































Figure 22.   Regression Tree (No EW, 50% Enemy Breakpoint / Blue Casualty MOE) 
 
A quick look at this regression tree indicates that there are 1980 total 
observations, as shown in the top node or “root” of the tree.  Additionally, the average 
number of Blue casualties is indicated to be about 20.  The first split to increase purity of 
this model occurs when range is at 781.  This split indicates two main things.  Firstly, it 
indicates that the most important factor in determining the number of Blue casualties is 
communications range.  Secondly, that when range is at least 781, the average number of 
Blue casualties is about 15.  This process of increasing purity continues down to the 
terminal nodes where additional insights may be discovered.   
Applying this explanation of regression trees, the first conclusion that may be 
extracted is that when the communication range is greater than 781 (the ability to 
communicate over 78 percent of the battlespace) generally good things happen for the 
Blue forces.  Note the left side of the regression tree predominantly yields lower mean 
Blue casualties than when range is less than 781.  Secondly, when latency is less than 11 
(meaning that communications are received by the sender within one minute of sending), 
generally casualties are lower for the Blue forces.  Finally, a great disparity exists when 
looking at the relative capacity of the network.  While there is no direct relationship 
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between the capacity parameter in MANA and bandwidth, this factor suggests that there 
is a region where the throughput of the network matters and should be examined in 
greater detail using a physics-based model where specific bandwidth requirements are 
modeled. 
A comparative analysis using a classification tree where Blue casualties are 
segregated into three quantiles (lower, middle and upper—representing low, medium and 





































































































Figure 23.   Classification Tree (No EW, 50% Enemy Breakpoint / Blue Casualty MOE) 
 
It is noted that casualties are generally classified as low or medium with higher 
probability when range is at least 719 and latency is at less than 10 (meaning that 
communications are received by the sender within one minute of sending).  Further, when 
capacity is less than 12, casualties are generally classified as high with greater 
probability.  It is noteworthy that both tree analyses presented yield comparative results 
with the multiple regression model presented earlier.  This type of analysis can be 
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extended to include the time of battle MOE.  These regression and classification trees 
indicate similar results and are included in Appendix B.   
The reader may notice that the analysis presented in this section has not indicated 
any significance to the two Blue force tactical considerations of early and late UAV 
priority of effort.  Recall that these factors are used to focus UAV efforts on a particular 
enemy asset (dismounts, armor, air defense and mortars) at various points in the battle.  
One of these categorical variables, much like the observations in the pre-production 
experiment sets, tends to overwhelm the communication factors of interest and was 
omitted from the analysis presented, but is examined in further detail below.   
Analysis shows that while late UAV effort is insignificant in all regression 
analysis, one particular level of early UAV effort stands out.  The regression coefficients 
of these two variables yield significant insights however for the tactical commander.  
When the factor of early UAV effort is included in the analysis, three of the settings are 
significant (dismounts, armor and mortars), accounting for a combined 20 percent of the 
total explained variance in the model.  Table 13 shows the regression coefficients for one 
representative example (enemy breakpoint of 75 percent using Blue casualties as the 
response).   




Table 13. Early UAV Effort Coefficients (EW, 75% Enemy Breakpoint / Blue Casualties MOE) 
 
Notice the negative coefficient when the UAVs have a priority to focus on the 
enemy dismounts.  Noting that the response in this example is the number of Blue 
casualties, the greatest “bang for the buck” occurs when dismounts are the primary focus 
of early UAV effort.  Focusing on the armor and mortar assets actually increases the 
expected number of Blue casualties, while focusing UAV efforts on the enemy dismounts 
shortens the expected length of the battle and Blue losses.   
A tactical commander might be tempted to focus their UAV reconnaissance assets 
on high value targets such as armor and mortar assets.  However, in this scenario at least, 
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it would appear that these UAV assets are better utilized by identifying and providing 
targeting information on the dismounted defensive positions.  Noteworthy is the fact that 
the primary Blue killing system during the early battle is the NLOS systems.  By design 
(and tactical insight as well) NLOS systems are much more effective against dismounted 
forces than armor.   
2. Network Attack Significance Analysis 
The previous section uncovered several communication factors and levels where 
they are important to the FCS.  The second portion of this analysis focuses on how the 
FCS is affected when the enemy possesses and chooses to use an EW capability.   The 
goal is to uncover insights for the third analysis question. 
• How do network attacks (complete and partial degradation) and the Future 
Force’s ability to respond to the attacks hamper fighting ability?  
We examine this question using the second experimental data set.  Recall that this 
experimental set varies seven communication factors, two tactical employment factors 
(UAV employment focus) and the time and duration at which the enemy employs EW.  
This is done at the two representative enemy breakpoints.  The Blue forces are assumed 
to have “good” communications prior to the attack, and during the attack, the 
communication factors are degraded.   
This analysis is conducted identically as the previous section, namely, by 
identifying significant factors using multiple regression and then determining levels at 
which those factors are significant using regression and classification trees.  As with the 
previous analysis, the data is analyzed using both MOEs.  A consolidated table is shown 







Enemy Breakpoint/MOE Rank Factor Sum of Squares 
1 Range 178.93 
2 Latency 119.42 
3 Capacity 114.83 
4 Time of EW 68.03 
50 percent / Blue 
Casualties 
(R2 = 0.69) 
5 Duration of EW 39.42 
1 Range 3725.32 
2 Latency 2697.46 
3 Time of EW 2289.50 
4 Capacity 1977.16 
50 percent / Time of 
Battle 
(R2 = 0.62) 
5 Duration of EW 1048.27 
1 Range 269.24 
2 Latency 229.87 
3 Range / Time of EW Interaction 153.23 
4 Time of EW 101.09 
75 percent / Blue 
Casualties 
(R2 = 0.59) 
 5 Capacity 56.91 
1 Latency 7664.42 
2 Range 6146.54 
3 Early UAV Effort 5598.21 
4 Time of EW 4020.55 
75 percent Time of 
Battle 
(R2 = 0.58) 
5 Duration of EW 2980.23 
Table 14. Factor Significance for Experimental Design Set Two 
 
Aggregating these results into a single table which shows the prominence of 
factors examined in these data sets helps to detect recurring patterns in the analyses.  
Table 15 records the number of times a specific factor appeared in the four regression 








Factor Number of Times Deemed Significant 
Range 4 
Latency 4 
Time of EW 4 
Capacity 3 
Duration of EW 3 
Early UAV Effort 1 
Range / Time of EW Interaction 1 
 
Table 15. Aggregation of Significant Factors (EW / All MOEs & Enemy Breakpoints) 
The overlap of significant factors gives insight concerning the importance of 
factors.  The fact that range, latency and time of EW occur in all data sets using both 
MOEs is again noteworthy.  This suggests that these factors could be the prominent 
communication factors which have an effect on the effectiveness of the FCS in this 
setting.  As well, capacity and the duration of EW (Blue force response to the attack) 
appear to be prominent.  
With these insights on the prominent communications factors, further analysis is 
conducted to determine the levels where these factors are significant.  To examine this 
question, regression and classification trees are constructed.  Guided by the regression 
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Figure 24.   Regression Tree (EW, 75% Enemy Breakpoint / Time of Battle MOE) 
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The first point that may be extracted from this tree is that when the enemy 
chooses to employ their EW assets early in the battle, the battle length is generally 
longer.  Note the right side of the tree where the enemy EW is employed very early yields 
a comparatively high time of battle.  Secondly, when the communication system has a 
limited message queuing ability, battle lengths also tend to be longer.  The final 
observation is that if queue buffer size is large enough for the FCS, the Blue forces must 
also have a responsive network to provide a “quick” decisive battle.   
A comparative analysis using a classification tree where the times of battle are 
segregated into three quantiles (lower, middle and upper—representing low, medium and 





































































































Figure 25.   Classification Tree (EW, 75% Enemy Breakpoint / Time of Battle MOE) 
It is noted that the time of battle is generally classified as long when the enemy 
chooses to employ their EW early in the battle.  Additionally, increased capacity and 
decreased latency are important capabilities when a short duration battle is desired.  Once 
again, these observations are representative of the analysis conducted with regression and 
classification trees and these trees are presented in Appendix B.    
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3. Most Vital Link Analysis 
As discussed earlier, this analysis shifts focus from the FCS operating in a 
degraded communications environment to conducting operations in an environment 
where complete degredation is experienced in a particular battlefield operating system.  
This corresponds to the fourth and final research question. 
• If destroyed or hampered, which communication link(s) most affect the 
Future Force in terms of mission accomplishment?  
Once again, using the analysis template shown in the previous two sections, we 
examine this question using the third experimental data set.  Recall that this experimental 
set varies the activation times of each enemy EW system over many levels.  This is once 
again done at the two representative enemy breakpoints.  The Blue forces are assumed to 
have “good” communications prior to the attack, and during the attack, the 
communication link is severely degraded.   A consolidated table of regression results is 
shown in Table 14 which contains the rank ordered importance of the communication 
links for the data sets and MOEs.   
Enemy Breakpoint/MOE Rank Factor Sum of Squares 
1 Armor Communication Link 1725.89 
2 UAV Communication Link 47.39 
50 percent / Blue 
Casualties 
(R2 = 0.85) 3 Dismount Communication Link 23.87 
1 Armor Communication Link 38268.92 
2 UAV Communication Link 938.05 
50 percent / Time of 
Battle 
(R2 = 0.89) 3 Dismount Communication Link 713.04 
1 Armor Communication Link 3960.14 
2 UAV Communication Link 224.60 
75 percent / Blue 
Casualties 
(R2 = 0.90) 3 Dismount Communication Link 12.18 
1 Armor Communication Link 303643.61 
2 UAV Communication Link 4197.16 
75 percent Time of 
Battle 
(R2 = 0.85) 3 Dismount Communication Link 1392.69 
 
Table 16. Factor Significance for Experimental Design Set Three 
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It is shown that a linear model which contains only main effects yields a fairly 
well-fit model.  Any interaction terms, while informational, yields little additional insight 
to the problem at hand.  Noteworthy is the great disparity of the significance between the 
armor communication link and the dismount and UAV communication links.  The armor 
communication link is clearly the most significant factor when a particular battlefield 
operating system is targeted by enemy EW.   
While regression and classification trees have been shown to reveal insights about 
the data in the previous two systems, when such a great disparity exists in factor 
importance, these tools offer little insight to the problem.  In essence, these trees reveal 
that the earlier in the battle that the enemy cuts the armor communication link, the worse 
off it is for the Blue forces.  With that, a possible explanation for this behavior is 
warranted.  
One reason for the significance of the armor communication link is that the armor 
assets have substantial sensing abilities.  Many redundant and complimentary means of 
identifying enemy targets (radar, enhanced optical, thermal sensors) mounted on a mobile 
platform makes the armor assets both a key killing and sensing asset.  The armor assets, 
when unable to relay their enemy intelligence essentially takes a very significant NLOS 
system targeting ability away from the FCS.  This significantly diminishes the effects of a 
combined arms battle.  In essence, the FCS, instead of being a system of complimentary 
systems, becomes a unit that fights a series of independent battles within battlefield 
operating systems (infantry fighting infantry, tanks fighting tanks, NLOS systems 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
STUDIES 
A. SUMMARY 
Each of the designed experimental sets and corresponding analysis provides 
findings to consider when designing a communication system to support the FCS.  As the 
US Army proceeds into the system design and development stage of acquisition of these 
systems, some useful insights from this analysis should be taken into account.   
Firstly, this analysis, while believed by the author to be beneficial, must not be 
overstated.  All conclusions are derived from analysis based on output from a low to 
medium resolution model that should be viewed as a distillation tool.  While believed to 
be free of major bugs and modeling errors, the analysis does not take into account 
physical aspects of modeling communication effects.  Since the beginning of this 
analysis, tools have been developed to examine these effects in a high resolution model 
setting.  Insights gleaned from this analysis should be examined in greater detail using 
these models.  Additionally, conclusions drawn are for only one mission set (attack) of 
many mission sets that the FCS must be capable of operating in. 
With that disclaimer, it should be noted that a viable communication network IS 
important to the FCS.  This network requires special attention when designing its 
characteristics and should be treated as a MAIN component of the FCS.  If a 
communication network is unable to support the integration of all of the battlefield 
operating systems, the increased mobility, sensing and targeting abilities of the FCS are 
for naught.  The levels of importance shown in Chapter V, should be used as a starting 
point for future analysis to focus precious modeling time on high-resolution models.  A 
summary of those findings are shown below. 
• While believed that communication range will not be an issue with evolving 
communications equipment, the Army must be sure of this.  Even a degredation 
of 25 percent on the ability to communicate over the entire battlespace could have 
dramatic consequences for the FCS.  While tactically the Army “ adapts and  
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overcomes” issues during combat and would be able to mitigate some of the 
consequences of diminished communication range, this process takes time and affects 
all units involved. 
• An unresponsive or slow network is nearly as detrimental to the FCS as 
diminished communications range.  It has been shown in this analysis that when 
intelligence on a fairly static enemy employed in the defense is delayed, the battle 
time is extended and Blue forces generally pay for that delay in casualties.  Future 
high-resolution modeling should look at network delays greater than one minute 
to gain the most from these simulations.  Additionally, it has been shown that the 
network capacity can easily be overwhelmed and system designers should look at 
the required bandwidth to ensure a capable FCS.  Finally, while not modeled in 
this analysis, the responsive network also has fire control system design 
implications as well.  Any fire control system must be designed with timely 
response in mind.  A round from an NLOS system delivered too late is wasted 
effort. 
• Reliability, while important, is not as significant in a system with many means of 
redundancy (such as the FCS).  Even if a substantial amount of communication 
links are unable to relay enemy intelligence, there are many others that are able to 
“pick up the slack.” 
• Enemy electronic warfare assets must not be underestimated and should be a 
focus of any pre-engagement intelligence activities.  As indicated, even a limited 
attack on a particular battlefield operating system (armor assets), could prove to 
be costly for the FCS.  
• Tactical insights such as those presented in pre-production observations must be 
noted.  NLOS systems, when performing as specified, present an incredible asset 
which can set the tone for FCS battlefield success and must be allowed to attrite 
the enemy as long as possible.  Additionally, the effects of combat multipliers 
such as phychological operations should be an integral part of the FCS operational 
and organizational structure to help set the tone for a successful battle.  Finally, 
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intuition should be confirmed to ensure proper prioritization of limited UAV 
assets.  A correct prioritization of effort could assist the FCS in any tactical goal.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
It has been said that any good analysis uncovers many more questions than 
originally posed.  While no assertions are made as to the quality of this analysis, there are 
significant questions still left to be examined in the communications realm of the FCS 
implementation.  The analysis presented is a single “data point.”  This analysis has drawn 
conclusions based on an enemy employed in the defense.  The Blue forces are assumed to 
have had sufficient preparation time to survey the enemy and forge battle plans.   
One of the major “selling points” of the FCS is that it is a “strategically 
responsive, precision maneuver force, dominant across the range of military 
operations.”41  This alone warrants more investigation on the communications effects in 
other settings such as MOUT, low intensity conflict, defensive, and movement to contact 
operations.  This analysis could be used as a launch point, using MANA as the platform.  
All agents have been designed, taking great care to model stated performance parameters 
and could be used for further analysis.   
Further research could examine how other agent-based models could augment or 
even contradict findings presented in this thesis.  For other, more detailed analytic effort, 
this scenario could be used to guide analysis in a high-resolution combat model such as 
CASTFOREM to uncover physics-based insights on communications behavior.   
Finally, factors such as weapons effectiveness were not explicitly explored to 
uncover other insights that may be significant to the FCS.  Should the combined effects 
of a degraded communications network and decreased specified weapons effectiveness be 
of interest, this analysis could serve as a launch point for future analysis.    
The MANA scenario files and Excel modeling files discussed are both available 
by contacting CPT Joseph Lindquist, United States Military Academy, Department of 
Mathematical Sciences, West Point, New York, or by email at 
joseph.lindquist@us.army.mil . 
                                                 
41 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Army Future Force: Decisive 21st Century 
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APPENDIX A. WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS 
Raw Blue force characteristics: 
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Blue force MANA converted characteristics continued: 
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Red Force characteristics: 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL REGRESSION AND 
CLASSIFICATION TREES 
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